

Haitian Strategic Culture

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FINDINGS REPORT

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The FIU-SOUTHCOM Academic Partnership Strategic Cultures Assessments

Florida International University's Applied Research Center (FIU ARC), in collaboration with the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and FIU's Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC), has recently formed the FIU-SOUTHCOM Academic Partnership. The partnership entails FIU providing the highest quality research-based knowledge to further explicative understanding of the political, strategic, and cultural dimensions of state behavior and foreign policy. This goal will be accomplished by employing a strategic culture approach. The initial phase of strategic culture assessments consists of a year-long research program that focuses on developing a standard analytical framework to identify and assess the strategic culture of ten Latin American countries. FIU will facilitate professional presentations of the following ten countries over the course of one year: Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina. In addition, a findings report on the impact of Islam and Muslims within Latin America will be produced.

The overarching purpose of the project is two-fold: to generate a rich and dynamic base of knowledge pertaining to the political, social, and strategic factors that influence state behavior; and to contribute to SOUTHCOM's Socio-Cultural Dynamics (SCD) Program. Utilizing the notion of strategic culture, SOUTHCOM has commissioned FIU ARC to conduct country studies in order to explain how states comprehend, interpret, and implement national security policy vis-à-vis the international system.

SOUTHCOM defines strategic culture as follows: "the combination of internal and external influences and experiences – geographic, historical, cultural, economic, political and military – that shape and influence the way a country understands its relationship to the rest of the world, and how a state will behave in the international community." FIU will identify and expound upon the strategic and cultural factors that inform the rationale behind the perceptions and behavior of select states in the present political and security climate by analyzing demography, history, regional customs, traditions, belief systems, and other cultural and historical influences that have contributed to the development of a particular country's current security rationale and interpretation of national security.

To meet the stated goals, FIU ARC will host a series of professional workshops in Miami. These workshops bring subject matter experts from all over the US and Latin America together to explore and discuss a country's specific history, geography, culture, economic, political, and military climates vis-à-vis strategic culture. At the conclusion of each workshop, FIU publishes a findings report, which is presented at SOUTHCOM.

The following Haiti Findings Report, authored by Dr. Eduardo Gamarra and Brian Fonseca, is the product of a working group held in Miami on August 6, 2009, which included ten prominent academic and private sector experts in Haitian history, culture, geography, economics, politics, and military affairs.

The views expressed in this findings report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US Government, US Department of Defense, US Southern Command, FIU-ARC, or Florida International University.

On behalf of FIU-ARC, we wish to acknowledge and thank all of the participants for their contributions, which made the Haitian Strategic Culture workshop a tremendous success.

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Executive Summary

Origins of Haitian Strategic Culture

- A contentious, antagonistic, and often violent relationship has defined interactions between the masses and the political elite. The perception is that the State, controlled by predatory elites, has historically extracted resources from the populace, often through violence, and has not provided substantial long term benefits to Haitian society.
- Notions of race and color are formative influences on Haitian Strategic Culture. Haiti was founded by slaves who obtained freedom through revolutionary violence. As a result, support for revolutionary change and a profound anti-slavery sentiment are key dimensions of Haitian Strategic Culture.
- Race, color, and nationalism have been operative factors in the relationship between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Multiple factors impact the relationship, including: the traditional Haitian belief in the indivisibility of the island of Hispaniola, the legacy of the twenty-two-year rule over Santo Domingo by Haiti, the fact that the Dominican Republic celebrates its independence from Haiti rather than a European colonial power, the subsequent and recurrent episodes of racism and violence, and the ongoing mass migration of Haitian nationals. Together, these factors have impacted the evolution of Strategic Culture on both sides of Hispaniola.
- A recurrent pattern of foreign occupation, interference, and intervention contradicts the principles upon which the first free black republic was founded. The profound sentiments of anti-colonization and anti-slavery that underlie Haitian society and Strategic Culture are divorced from the State's recurrent inability to provide a safe and stable political, social, and economic context within which to recognize those values.

- Violence, as a mode of effectuating political change, has been the traditional means utilized by the elite and the masses throughout Haitian history. Structural violence is reflected in the State and its relationship to the populace.
- Society is inherently individualistic. There is a paucity of social capital available upon which to construct civil society premised on collective interests and goals.

Keepers of Haitian Strategic Culture

- Haiti is a predatory State. The elite who wield power within the State have pursued self-aggrandizement and unfettered self-interest. The ethos of the political elite, historically, is one of self-preservation and the preservation and perpetuation of power. A “public interest” is, for all intents and purposes, non-existent as an operative factor in State behavior.
- Defense and security are internally focused. Since the early 1990s, Haiti has had no formal, functioning military. Rather, it has had an internal domestic police force that is strictly focused on preserving and maintaining domestic order. Haiti thus has no military-based foreign or domestic policy.

Challenges, Continuity and Change in Haitian Strategic Culture

- Haiti does not possess or exercise sovereignty (de facto and de jure) in the traditional and functional sense of the word. The State is completely reliant on foreign aid and assistance to maintain itself. The State is incapable of performing the basic duties and responsibilities of a traditional state, viz. providing a secure and stable context for civil society. International organizations (NGOs and IGOs) and foreign states provide peacekeeping (e.g., UN), funding (e.g., IMF, World Bank, US direct financial aid), supplies, and disaster relief. In short, IOs and foreign states buttress and maintain the Haitian State.

- The State thus competes with non-State actors for power and control over its agenda. The State's agenda is focused on extracting as much aid as possible from the international community (because the populace has nothing more to give/have taken away). Non-State actors are, in essence, what keep the Haitian State from imploding. Major non-State actors that affect Haitian Strategic Culture are drug cartels, religious institutions, and legal NGOs. The main external threat to the State is its lack of sovereignty and foreign (State and non-State) interference in Haitian domestic affairs.
- Haitians are sensitive to the perceptions of the international community; *viz.* the populace is viewed negatively because of Haiti's severe paucity of political, social, and economic development.
- Haiti is undergoing rapid deforestation and soil erosion, which have an adverse effect on physical security and may lead to natural disasters such as flooding, as well as the inability to sustain long-term agriculture. The US military can provide technical, logistical, and material support to alleviate the effects of natural disasters.
- Migration—legal and illegal—is a primary means by which Haitian people seek to improve their socioeconomic and political state of affairs. Illegal immigration in particular is the most attractive option to a populace that resides on the fringes of anarchy, insecurity, and instability.

The Origins of Haitian Strategic Culture

The origins of Haitian Strategic Culture are grounded in historical, structural, and cultural factors. The most significant historical factors include the legacy of being the first free slave nation, a recurrent pattern of foreign intervention, and very conflictive relations with the neighboring Dominican Republic. Of equal importance are structural factors which are impossible to modify and which have a dramatic impact on everything from the way in which Haitians view the world to elite political behavior. These structural factors range from the geographic location of Haiti and its vulnerability to natural disasters, to the weakness of the State, its demography, land tenure, and economic viability. Finally, Haitian Strategic Culture is grounded in a political culture that mistrusts the State and the elite who administer it, and which is heavily influenced by religion, including Voodoo, Catholicism and, more recently, Pentecostalism. Not surprisingly, in this type of political environment, actors often turn to violence to produce change in the context of non-institutionalized settings.

Culture, Security and State Formation: An Historical Perspective

To identify the origins of Strategic Culture and the relationship between culture, perceptions of security, and strategic thought, it is necessary to begin with an understanding of the role of structural violence in the formation of the Haitian State. Before becoming the first black independent nation in the Latin American-Caribbean region, Haiti was forged in the brutality and violence of slavery, colonialism, and imperialism. The first free black republic was established through revolutionary violence beginning in 1791 and ending in 1804. Haiti's revolution was less about independence and more about freedom from slavery. This is evident in Toussaint Louverture's—the main hero of the Revolution's—vision of a free Haiti with direct links with France to ensure markets for its sugar and rum.¹ Later, Jean Jacques Dessalines, a military commander and another prominent organizer of the revolution, was proclaimed Emperor for life by the army, and began his rule by exiling or exterminating the remaining European whites. Dessalines became a victim of his own violent methods; he was

¹ Bernard Diedrich, Papa Doc and the Tontons Macoutes, Markus Wiener Publishers, Princeton, 2005.

assassinated on 17 October 1806.² Violence remained a salient and basic operating principle by which the Haitian State functioned, and violence influenced how transfers of power occurred. Structural violence has thus been at the core of Haitian Strategic Culture since its inception. Perpetual violence “engenders behavior which makes it impossible to develop a political [and strategic] culture of stable expectations.”³

One of the most recurrent dimensions of Haitian political history is the contentious, antagonistic and violent relationship between and among the political and economic elite and the masses. Generally speaking, the State has been perceived as the domain of a predatory elite that failed both at providing effective governance and institution building; instead, it dedicated itself to the extraction of resources from the populace. Given the State’s institutional weakness, all governments have used the repressive arm of the State to both exploit and violently pacify the population. Hence, the Haitian State has been perceived as a predatory State:

Haitians relate to State and Government with deep mistrust, firm expectation of corruption and personal enrichment by the ruling elites drawing from State resources, paired, however, with the hope that explicit support for a member of the ruling elite will translate into that member’s willingness to share some of the available resources with his or her constituency. This attitude towards the ruling class explains why the mistrust of people towards the State on the one hand and their reliance on it for help on the other, are not, as often postulated, a paradox. Rather, it is a continuation of the classic concept of clientelism—a system rewarding political support with favors.⁴

Thus:

[The] key to assessing Haiti’s strategic culture is to understand the unique nature

² US Library of Congress, “Country Studies: Haiti,” *Library of Congress Federal Research Division*, 8 Oct. 2009 <<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html>>.

³ Anthony Maingot, “Haiti’s Strategic Political Culture: Hypotheses on its deep Structural Origins,” paper prepared for Haiti Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, August 6, 2009.

⁴ (Anonymous) Paper prepared for Haiti Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, August 6, 2009.

of the country's origin: Haiti is a nation born out of a slave revolution. While most of the countless international analyses point to the fact that Haiti is a country founded by slaves as an important historic marker, rarely is enough attention paid to the implications that this entails; implications not only for the country's political, social, and economic development after the historic date of 1804 but—more relevant for this analysis—for every facet of [the] Haitian state and society today.⁵

Another important dimension regarding the discussion of the Haitian State concerns contemporary notions of “failed states.” It is commonplace today to find numerous references to Haiti as a “failed State.” The State in Haiti never developed the institutional strength that would allow governments to govern effectively. In other words, a “public interest” was never fully articulated, public policy was rarely applicable, national and citizen security was more a desire than a reality, and effective control over a relatively small geographic territory has always been elusive. Put another way, Haiti represents a case of an incomplete State, a national project that began with the 1804 Revolution and has yet to be completed.⁶

Geography

Haitian Strategic Culture is also the result of geographical considerations—from its proximity to the United States and the cohabitation of the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic, to the physical disconnection between Port-Au-Prince and the rest of the country, to the vast environmental challenges that have undermined its economic progress. These geographical features have profoundly impacted both Haiti's relationship with foreign powers and aided in the fragmentation of Haitian society—geographically spacing the Haitian elite in Port-Au-Prince away from the masses around the country. Together, these considerations exacerbate Haitian fears of re-colonization, slavery,

⁵ (Anonymous) Paper prepared for Haiti Strategic Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, August 6, 2009.

⁶ Anthony Maingot, “Haiti's Strategic Political Culture: Hypotheses on its deep Structural Origins,” paper prepared for Haiti Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, August 6, 2009.

sovereignty, and underdevelopment, and foster individualistic tendencies within Haitian society.

Haiti is the third largest country in the Caribbean, behind Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Haiti shares a common border with the Dominican Republic which spans 224 miles. Relations with the Dominican Republic, based on geopolitics and race/color, especially during the Trujillo dictatorship, have been acrimonious and occasionally violent. The explicit discrimination against Haitians based on their blackness was actively pursued during the Trujillo era, especially in the mid 1930s. This racial policy posited that Dominicans were the descendants of the Spaniards and the Taino Indians that populated the island before the arrival of Columbus, and Haitians were viewed as the inconsequential and inferior descendants of African slaves.⁷ To prevent the Dominican Republic from being overrun by black Haitians, Trujillo initiated the “Dominicanization” of the border region. Dominicanization resulted in the massacre of thousands of Haitians in October 1937, which came to be known as the Parsley Massacre.⁸ Trujillo also sought to develop the border region by having light-skinned Dominicans settle along the border. Some scholars argue that relations with the Dominican Republic play into Haitian fears of re-colonization or the desire to effectuate the reunification of the island of Hispaniola. Nonetheless, the border remains a contentious factor in bilateral relations and the Dominican Republic is often perceived as a viable threat to Haitian sovereignty. The paradox is that Dominicans also perceive Haiti as a threat to their sovereignty.

In Haiti, there is a tremendous disconnection between the countryside and the city (Port-Au-Prince), as well as between rural/urban centers/societies geographically, politically, economically, and socially. This can be attributed to the lack of infrastructure connecting rural and urban societies to the extent that the Haitian State is rarely visible outside of Port-Au-Prince. The lack of presence by the State in rural societies creates political and economic separation. As a result, rural societies are unable to capitalize on foreign markets and remain disconnected from the State.

⁷ Ernesto Sagás, “A Case of Mistaken Identity: Antihaitianismo in Dominican Culture,” 8 Oct. 2009 <<http://www.webster.edu/~corbetre/haiti/miscopic/dominican/antihaiti.htm>>.

⁸ Ernesto Sagás, “An Apparent Contradiction? Popular Perceptions of Haiti and the Foreign Policy of the Dominican Republic,” Paper presented at the Sixth Annual Conference of the Haitian Studies Association, Boston, MA October 14-15, 1994, 8 Oct. 2009 <<http://haitiforever.com/windowsonhaiti/esagas2.shtml>>.

Topographically, Haiti is comprised of mountainous terrain interspersed with plains, plateaus, and coastal settlements. Haiti's northern region consists of the Northern Massif and the Northern Plain. The Northern Massif is an extension of the Cordillera Central in the Dominican Republic, beginning at Haiti's eastern border and extending to the northwest through the northern peninsula. The lowlands of the Northern Plain lie along the northern border with the Dominican Republic, between the Northern Massif and the Atlantic Ocean. The central region consists of two plains and two sets of mountain ranges. The Central Plateau extends along both sides of the Guayamouc River, south of the Northern Massif, running from the southeast to the northwest. The southern region consists of the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac (the southeast) and the mountainous southern peninsula (Tiburon Peninsula). The Plaine du Cul-de-Sac is a natural depression that harbors saline lakes, and Haiti's largest lake (Lac Azuei). The Chaîne de la Selle Mountain range, an extension of the southern mountain chain of the Dominican Republic (that is, the Sierra de Baoruco), extends from the Massif de la Selle in the east to the Massif de la Hotte in the west.⁹ The most important valley for agriculture purposes is the Plaine de l' Artibonite, south of the Montagnes Noires.¹⁰

In terms of biodiversity and environmental issues, Haiti has witnessed the decimation of its forests and arable lands, resulting in desertification, deforestation, and soil erosion; in less than 75 years, Haiti has lost more than half of its original forest cover. This is largely a result of Haiti's reliance on wood-based charcoal for its energy needs. Deforestation has, in turn, contributed to severe climactic changes that increase Haiti's susceptibility to flooding and other natural disasters. Furthermore, hurricanes and tropical storms are natural events that carry a great potential for inflicting massive damage due to large-scale deforestation and soil erosion. This state of affairs presents

⁹ S.B. Hedges, "Distribution Patterns of Amphibians in the West Indies," in W.E. Duellman (ed.), *Patterns of Distribution of Amphibians: A Global Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) 211-254, 8 Oct. 2009 <<http://evo.bio.psu.edu/caribherp/biogeo/hisp.htm>>; US Central Intelligence Agency, "Country Profile: Haiti," *CIA World Fact-Book* <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html>>.

¹⁰ Richard A. Haggerty, ed. *Haiti: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1989) 8 Oct. 2009 <<http://countrystudies.us/haiti/19.htm>>.

serious problems for a state that has very little infrastructure and institutionalized means to manage natural disasters.¹¹

Politics, Race and Class in Haitian Strategic Culture

Structural violence is ingrained in the history and fabric of Haitian society and the polity. Whether it was being brutalized by colonial powers, fighting a revolutionary war to end slavery, experiencing elite in-fighting for control of the state in a manner that included assassination, street violence, coups, political imprisonment, and exile and disappearance of leaders of opposition, contending with the Dominican Republic's ethnic and racial cleansing policies steeped in Dominicanization, or fear of the State as a predatory entity, Haiti has had an intimate relationship with violence as an ordering principle. Thus, when considering the origins of Haitian Strategic Culture in light of politics, race, color, and class, violence has defined interactions between individuals, elites, the masses, and the State.

Politics, race, color, and class are grounded in violence, and each has profoundly impacted the other when considering the evolution of Haitian Strategic Culture. In the realm of politics, there are very high levels of corruption and predatory behavior by public officials toward the populace. Stratification based on color and class has been an operative factor in politics:

Historically, educated members of the elite (public officials, intellectuals, *commerçants*) have been the keepers and disseminators of ideas that shape Haiti's strategic culture. These individuals have access to information, the means to publish their own ideas (at home and abroad), travel ... and establish commercial connections ... [Elite] Haitians have historically been a very internationally engaged population. These connections have yielded opportunities and presented challenges as Haiti's educated elite [has] fostered a sense of identification and alliance among Haiti's educated elites and foreigners. These ties have also generated some well-founded criticism about how some members of the Haitian

¹¹ Richard A. Haggerty, ed. *Haiti: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1989) 8 Oct. 2009 <<http://countrystudies.us/haiti/19.htm>>.

elite have maintained an outward-looking, cosmopolitan gaze and identity to the detriment of Haitian society and culture.¹²

Having an outward and externally engaged elite has produced a weak to non-existent linkage between those who wield power and the mass they should supposedly serve. Politics is thus a means of self-aggrandizement, wherein elites invest their time, energies, resources, et cetera, outside of Haiti. The internal foci of political elites are relegated to the extraction of international aid and resources for personal gain, as opposed to using aid to serve the “public interest.”¹³

Historically, politics has been shaped by personalistic and individualistic rule. Indeed, both nations of Hispaniola share—along with much of the developing world—a tendency toward:

. . . political organization built upon the personalistic followings of strongmen, or caudillos, rather than on more legalistic bases, such as constitutionalism. This similarity in political culture helps to explain the chronologically staggered parallels between the brutal regimes of Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina (1930-61) in the Dominican Republic and that of the Duvaliers—François Duvalier (1957-71) and his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971-86)—in Haiti. Both regimes lasted for approximately thirty years; both were headed by non-ideological despots; both regimes sustained themselves in power by employing terror and ruthlessly suppressing dissent; both drew the ire of an international community that ultimately proved incapable of directly forcing them from power; and both left their countries mired in political chaos and internal conflict upon their demise.¹⁴

This is not to say, however, that the dominant elite class is monolithic in composition. The dominant class or sector of the upper Haitian elite “has reactionary and

¹² Gerald F. Murray, “Strategic Culture: An Anthropological Summary,” paper prepared for Haiti Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, August 6, 2009.

¹³ Marvin Astrada, “Haitian Strategic Culture,” paper prepared for the Haiti Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, August 6, 2009

¹⁴ US Library of Congress, Country Report: Haiti, *US Library of Congress Federal Research Division*, 9 Oct. 2009 <<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+ht0004%29>>.

reformist wings and is composed of a ruling class proper—a class that controls the state apparatus to enrich itself through prebendary gains, and a ‘possessing’ class that accumulates wealth mainly through ‘comprador’ activities.”¹⁵ The notion of a “possessing class” is derived from the French *classe possédante*, that is, “a class which has accumulated wealth through private ventures and independently of direct state predations ... In Haiti, mulattoes and ‘Arabs,’ two groups whose racial heritage and complexion make them unlikely political rulers, have dominated this class.”¹⁶ The lower sectors of the Haitian elite are comprised of *la petite bourgeoisie*, and the lower orders and subordinate and marginalized masses are identified as the *moun andeyo*. Like the upper elite, these sectors are not static; they are internally fragmented, dynamic, and individual members of each can easily move from one to the other in times of political crisis and when interests are better met or rather protected and secured by affiliation with a particular group, movement, or political/economic form of organization; for example, dictatorship, military junta, and/or external control of the country by state and non-state actors.

A strong opportunism has marked Haitian history:

There is an astonishing circulation of leaders, class fractions, and parties from one sector to another. Dramatic *volte-faces* reflecting very sudden changes of allegiance are common among the political elites and class groupings. Defection and expulsion from ‘political families’ and the reintegration and cooptation into them, are primary characteristics of the conflictive nature of Haitian politics.¹⁷

¹⁵ Gerald F. Murray, “Strategic Culture: An Anthropological Summary,” and Chantalle F. Verna, “Origins of Haitian Strategic Culture,” papers prepared for Haiti Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, August 6, 2009.

¹⁶ Gerald F. Murray, “Strategic Culture: An Anthropological Summary,” and Chantalle F. Verna, “Origins of Haitian Strategic Culture,” papers prepared for Haiti Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, August 6, 2009.

¹⁷ Gerald F. Murray, “Strategic Culture: An Anthropological Summary,” Chantalle F. Verna, “Origins of Haitian Strategic Culture,” and Matthew Smith, “Haitian History in the Context of Culture,” papers prepared for Haiti Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, August 6, 2009.

Thus, a paucity of social capital,¹⁸ that is, normalized patterns of interaction based on deep and established networks of trust and cooperation among social groups, is utterly lacking when considering political loyalties. As Gerald Murray notes, prime examples of this type of behavior and political orientation include when the “old” ruling class and reactionary segments of the “possessing” class were the basis of the neo-authoritarian coalition that supported wholeheartedly the coup of 1991, (some of their key figures gradually made their peace with Jean Bertrand Aristide once he returned to power), and when the “reformists” of the “possessing class” who had initially backed the *Lavalas* movement rejected Aristide due to the fear of Haiti lapsing into dictatorship yet again.¹⁹ Other examples are that of the urban poor or “Lumpen” which had served as the *Makoutist* foundation of the Duvalier dictatorship, the “*attachés*” of the Raoul Cédras junta, which became the “*Zinglentos*” of criminal bands, and the “*Chimères*” of an increasingly militarized *Lavalas*. Social classes have thus taken on different and contradictory positions depending on their self-interest and power-position in society. Ideological principles and loyalties are not a resilient and powerful means of organizing society, as in the case of Cuba.²⁰

Since the revolution, there has been a profound disconnection between the ideals and the impetus of revolution, (anti-slavery and anti-colonialism), and the formation of the Haitian State. Slavery, premised on inferiority based on race/color, has directly impacted Haitian Strategic Culture. Dominican-Haiti relations, for example, have been tintured by race and color, especially during the rule of Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo. The racism and violence that have defined modern Dominican-Haiti relations is reflective of the important role that race and color have had in the context of slavery and

¹⁸ See Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone : The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001).

¹⁹ Gerald F. Murray, “Strategic Culture: An Anthropological Summary,” and Chantalle F. Verna, “Origins of Haitian Strategic Culture,” papers prepared for Haiti Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, August 6, 2009.

²⁰ Gerald F. Murray, “Strategic Culture: An Anthropological Summary,” Chantalle F. Verna, “Origins of Haitian Strategic Culture,” and Matthew Smith, “Haitian History in the Context of Culture,” papers prepared for Haiti Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, August 6, 2009.

colonialism in impacting Haiti's Strategic Culture. Color has intimate ties with notions of anti-slavery and anti-colonialism that gave rise to an independent Haitian State.²¹

The origins of modern Haitian society thus lie within the slaveholding system:

The mixture of races that eventually divided Haiti into a small, mainly mulatto elite and an impoverished black majority began with the slave masters' concubinage of African women. Today Haiti's culture and its predominant religion (voodoo) stem from the fact that the majority of slaves in Saint Domingue were brought from Africa ... only a few of the slaves had been born and raised on the island. The slaveholding system ... was particularly cruel and abusive, and few slaves (especially males) lived long enough to reproduce. The racially tinged conflicts that have marked Haitian history can be traced similarly to slavery, [in that] while the masses of black slaves formed the foundation of colonial society, the upper strata evolved along lines of color and class. Most commentators have classified the population of the time into three groups: white colonists, or *blancs*; free blacks (usually mulattoes, or *gens de couleur*--people of color), or *affranchis*; and the slaves.²²

Divisions of class and color have thus exacerbated:

. . . [the] tension between freedom and despotism. The old dominant class has tended to retain its profound contempt for '*le peuple*.' It is not that the Haitian dominant class is the 'Most Repugnant Elite' ... it is simply that if it wants to keep its position at the top of the social pyramid, it has little room in which to maneuver. Under present conditions, democracy ... would inevitably challenge the structure of power and property rights, and this the dominant class knows and

²¹ Marvin Astrada, "Haitian Strategic Culture," paper prepared for the Haiti Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, August 6, 2009.

²² US Library of Congress, Country Report: Haiti, *US Library of Congress Federal Research Division*, 9 Oct. 2009 <<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+ht0016%29>>.

finds unacceptable. Its behavior differs little from that of any other dominant class confronted by a potentially overwhelming and hostile popular wave.²³

Generally speaking, the Haitian populace is very hostile to any notion of slavery, and the populace is also very hostile to the State as an expression of, or rather repository for, the old racist and color-biased principles that the revolution sought to eradicate. “There is chronic suspicion, hostility, and outright antipathy found among Haitians toward their own rulers. The national enthusiasm that Aristide provoked among the impoverished majority of the Haitian population, both rural and urban, was new—and fragile and ephemeral.”²⁴

A Legacy of Foreign Intervention

Most scholars agree that Haitian Strategic Culture entails a strong legacy of negatively-perceived occupation, interference, and intervention by foreign powers in Haitian socio-economic, political, and security affairs. Foreign intervention has indeed been a recurring phenomenon and is usually the product of internal political turmoil resulting from battles between sectors of the Haitian elite aiming to control the State. This pattern of foreign influence contradicts the principles upon which Haiti, the first black republic, was founded; the paradox is between independence and the inherent state of dependency that characterizes contemporary Haiti. Foreign influence can be traced from colonization of the island by the French, up through Haiti’s revolutionary period (1791–1803), to the era of United States occupation (1915–1934 and again in the early 1990s), and onward to the current United Nations “Stabilization Mission,” that is, MINUSTAH.²⁵ Most Haitian scholars point to this recurrent pattern of foreign intervention as one of the principal influences on the development of a Strategic Culture

²³ Gerald F. Murray, “Strategic Culture: An Anthropological Summary,” paper prepared for Haiti Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, August 6, 2009.

²⁴ Gerald F. Murray, “Strategic Culture: An Anthropological Summary,” and Matthew Smith, “Haitian History in the Context of Strategic Culture,” papers prepared for Haiti Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, August 6, 2009.

²⁵ Chantalle F. Verna, “Origins of Haitian Strategic Culture,” paper prepared for Haiti Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, August 6, 2009.

that is very mistrustful of foreign actors. The paradox is that as much as Haitians distrust foreigners, their nation is completely dependent on foreign actors for its survival.

A very casual glance at Haiti's history reveals that foreign intervention generally followed prolonged periods of internal political unrest. Most important, however, is that Haitian sensibilities about foreign intervention are reserved mainly for both France and the United States. France is perceived not only as the country from which Haiti liberated itself via a violent revolution, it is also the one that has often been perceived as attempting to retake control over the country. The United States, which indeed invaded and governed Haiti in the early part of the twentieth century, is often perceived as not only favoring the most repugnant sectors of the Haitian elite, but also as an imperialist country bent on re-asserting control over the Haitian nation.

The most recent instance of foreign intervention has occurred under the auspices of the United Nations. The MINUSTAH mission is performing domestic security functions that the Haitian State simply cannot conduct on its own. While the mission currently faces immeasurable challenges, public opinion regarding some of its actions and stabilization efforts has been very favorable. The main questions, however, are: how long will this mission last, and will its legacy be enough to transform Haiti? Or, will it be like previous foreign interventions that failed to bring significant change? Will it be adjudged as being one of the principal causes of Haiti's current predicaments?

Haitian/Dominican Relations

Another important dimension of foreign intervention involves the relations of Haiti with the neighboring Dominican Republic. The complexities that characterize contemporary Haitian-Dominican relations are rooted in an historical pattern that essentially began in 1804 when Haiti became an independent republic and vowed to unify the entire island of Saint Domingue. In 1822, Haiti achieved this goal and was able to retain control of the western side of the island until 1844. Depending on the nationality of the historian, this twenty-two-year period was either the age of terror for Dominicans or the age of glory for Haitians. The end result affected the development of national identities on both sides—or, for purposes of this work—the Strategic Cultures of both Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

In the years that followed the defeat of Haiti, the formation of Dominican national identity involved establishing an identity separate from anything even remotely associated with Haiti. Color and language became the most effective ways to create a distinct Dominican nation. Dominicans created a non-Haitian identity that involved forgetting and hiding their African roots and celebrating their Indian and white heritage. Ironically, Haiti was governed by a mulatto elite that also sought to downplay its African heritage. It wasn't until the mid-twentieth century that distinct negritude movements became viable ways to validate the African origins of Haitian culture.

The well-known slaughter of Haitians in the mid 1930s by the Trujillo government and the recurrent planning, funding, and execution of coups and countercoups from Dominican soil have also affected the course of relations between the two countries. And, more important, based on historical experience, Haitians perceive Dominicans as constantly meddling in their internal affairs. For our purposes, this repeated pattern has had a very serious impact on the formation of Haitian Strategic Culture. Even in the early part of this decade, Haitians who plotted to bring down the Aristide government presumably did so from Dominican territory with the alleged tacit endorsement, if not support, of the government of the then-president Hipólito Mejía. In sum, Dominicans are perceived as constant meddlers in Haitian affairs.


Dominicans are just as suspicious of foreign intervention as are Haitians. A common perception among the political elite is that the United States, especially the black caucus, has been pushing steadily since at least the early 1990s to unify the island. The declarations of former US presidents Bill Clinton and Jimmy Carter following trips to Haiti and the Dominican Republic show that the problems affecting both countries, such as malaria, must be addressed jointly. These concerns raised eyebrows in Santo Domingo, where some government officials rejected the declarations, claiming that they constituted meddling in the country's internal affairs.

The reality of the situation is that every day, hundreds, if not thousands of Haitians, cross into Dominican territory seeking jobs and an opportunity to trade whatever they can. While no accurate figure exists, most Dominicans believe that over one million Haitians live in their country and that they are taking jobs in the agriculture, tourism, and construction sectors, committing crimes against Dominicans, (including

drug trafficking, murders, rapes, robberies and assaults), deforesting their land, benefiting from free health care and educational services, and introducing illnesses that were previously under control (such as malaria, dengue, and HIV-AIDS). Public opinion polls conducted in the Dominican Republic since 2005 reflect the depth of this sentiment.

While there is some truth to these allegations, the reality is that Haitians are only relatively better off in the Dominican Republic than at home, and are just as much the victims of crime and disease as are Dominicans. It is also true that the growing Haitian population in the Dominican Republic is more visible today than ever. In entire neighborhoods in the capital city of Santo Domingo, as well as in towns on the border and even as far to the east as Higüey, Creole is the lingua franca. And, more important, the Haitian population in the Dominican Republic will continue to grow despite attempts to curtail entry by increasing a military presence at the border, changing the constitution to deny citizenship to children of undocumented Haitian immigrants, and basing immigration policies on racial animus.

How do Haitians affect the Dominican Republic?



*Source: Barometro June 2005

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Without the presence of any type of credible authority representing the Haitian State at the border, duties such as customs, immigration, and drug control rest solely on the Dominicans. Dominican authorities are often accused of acts of corruption, including charging Haitians to cross into the country and being involved in drug trafficking. For this reason, it is increasingly clear to at least some sectors of the Dominican political elite

that the only way to minimize the continued massive inflow of Haitian immigrants is to develop bilateral approaches including the signing of a free trade agreement and to join ongoing international efforts aimed at bringing an end to the Haitian crisis. A Dominican role in rebuilding Haiti will be filtered through Haitian Strategic Culture. Here lies yet another paradox, that is, the neighbor who discriminates against its citizens and so often sides with the exploitative elite may also hold one of the keys to rescuing Haiti from its current situation.

Finally, the fact that the fates of Haiti and the Dominican Republic are bound together is a statement grounded in geographic and economic reality. Haiti is the Dominican Republic's principal trade partner; estimates suggest that nearly \$500 million in export revenue streams into the Dominican Republic, while Haiti exports only about \$30 million to its neighbor. Without the revenue from Haiti, the Dominican Republic would likely face a serious economic downturn. And, without the exports that enter Haiti, the situation there would be even more chaotic.

The Dominican Republic is Haiti's most important trade partner

Años	Exportaciones de RD hacia Haiti		
	Nacionales	Zonas Francas	Nacionales y Zonas Francas
2004	65,686,727.86	12,885,462.96	78,572,190.84
2005	123,891,467.28	39,396,613.27	163,288,080.55
2006	147,165,725.47	153,574,400.81	300,760,126.28
2007	155,167,548.15	276,316,187.58	431,483,735.73
2008*	240,083,112.16	329,128,521.20	569,211,633.36
Total	732,014,580.94	811,301,185.82	1,543,315,766.76

The trade balance is skewed in favor of the Dominican Republic. Haiti is the Dominican Republic's third largest market only after the United States and Canada.

Summing Up: Haiti's Worldview

The foregoing discussion allows for the construction of a summary of the way in which Haitians view the world and, by extension, enable a more clear understanding of the Strategic Culture that prevails among political elites. Great sensitivity exists

regarding how Haiti and Haitians are viewed abroad. In public opinion surveys, academic writings, and other material pertaining to analyses of Haitian Strategic Culture, concern prevails over the world's lack of understanding of Haiti's particular situation. Often, this view translates into complaints about a misunderstanding of the historical legacy, especially its revolutionary origins, and the significance of how Haiti was the first nation to simultaneously end slavery and colonial rule.

At the same time, the view is that foreigners have never quite understood the predatory nature of the Haitian elite that succeeded colonial rule and that took turns misgoverning the country. As is the case in interpretations about the elite of any country, academics and others often chastise foreign powers such as the United States and France for siding with the elite over the well being of indigenous Haitians, to further their national interests. And, because of the revolutionary origins of Haiti, this view inherently contends that revolt, even if violent, is a viable and desirable way to bring about change for the collective good. Unfortunately, as Anthony Maingot notes, the depth of Haiti's crisis will not be resolved by a mere transfer of power from one elite group to another.²⁶

Another dimension of this worldview concerns how Haitians are treated abroad. This is another paradox in the context of many contradictions. For example, great sensitivity exists regarding how Haitians are treated in the Dominican Republic; thus, groundless or exaggerated accusations, such as Haitians are treated as actual slaves in the Dominican Republic, serve mainly to drum up Haitian nationalism and occasionally lead to violent confrontations along the border and in towns in the Dominican Republic where migrant laborers reside.

Much less awareness exists regarding the treatment of Haitian migrants elsewhere in the Caribbean and even the United States and Canada. While perhaps the situation of migrants is better comparatively, the international outcry is much less in these places. Some examples are when boatloads of Haitians are repatriated by the US Coast Guard or when Bahamian authorities round up boat people and return them home. The paradox is that no matter how poorly Haitian migrants are treated abroad, they continue to leave their homeland because they are lured by the promise of employment and better living

²⁶ Anthony Maingot, "Haiti's Strategic Political Culture: Hypotheses on its deep Structural Origins," paper prepared for Haiti Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, August 6, 2009.

conditions, as well as the possibility of reuniting with their relatives who have already fled Haiti. Such immigration further contributes to the pattern of decay at home.

While anti-slavery remains a core issue, anti-colonialism also survives as a key dimension of Haiti's worldview. For this reason, academic writings support the popular perception that foreign intervention has not led to improvements in the national situation, despite the building of roads and other infrastructure during the occasional foreign presence. Instead, they correctly point to the unfortunate emergence of personal dictatorships that inevitably followed long periods of foreign intervention. In this sense, the view is that US policies created these dictatorships to not only exploit Haiti, but to prevent the country from ever achieving its true potential. It is not surprising then that even the current UN mission is perceived with a strong sense of skepticism, mainly because the fear is that when it does indeed depart, the pattern of personal dictatorship will again emerge.

Race, color, and class cleavages have been prevalent throughout history and have molded the development of Haiti's economy, society, and polity. Along these lines, Haitians continue to perceive that they suffer great discrimination at home and abroad because of their color and race. This is clearly evident by the manner in which Haitians are treated in countries of African descent, such as the Dominican Republic and other Caribbean islands where thousands have arrived seeking shelter and better living opportunities. At the same time, the view continues to be that, in the end, light-skinned Haitians will again constitute the governing elite after foreign intervention has run its course. The view is that, historically, Haiti's elite, with varying degrees of popular support, has always gravitated toward authoritarianism, and that the possibility of democratic rule has proven itself to be elusive at best, given the political culture of the country. Recent public opinion data reveals a relatively strong preference for democracy, yet, comparatively speaking, Haitians are less satisfied with democracy than are many others in the hemisphere. This view is augmented by the overall distrust that Haitians have of political institutions such as parliament, political parties, and the judiciary.²⁷ While distrust of political institutions is prevalent throughout the hemisphere, even in the

²⁷ In LAPOP's 2008 survey the newly created Haitian police received very high marks from those surveyed. In fact, in contrast with other police institutions around the hemisphere, the Haitian police enjoys widespread support. This contrasts sharply with the prevalent distrust of political institutions.

United States and Europe, it is more serious in countries like Haiti where such institutions are so fundamentally weak or non-existent.

The possibility of strengthening these institutions is unlikely within a short period of time, especially given the dire conditions that prevail in Haiti. As was pointed out in the workshop, only about 11 percent of the electorate turned up to vote in the most recent parliamentary elections; such data reveals the profound distrust and apathy of Haitians toward democratic institutions and procedures. Unless something dramatic occurs that alters the deep sense of fatalism that prevails within the collective consciousness of the polity, it is unlikely that when the current UN mission withdraws, a democratic political culture will flourish.




Figure II-3. System Support in Comparative Perspective

Another seeming contradiction in Haiti's worldview is the widespread belief (held by academics, journalists, and popular opinion) that the island has been ignored and isolated by the world. This view is often supported by international actors ranging from former US presidents such as Bill Clinton and Jimmy Carter to Dominican leaders who express outrage over the abandonment of Haiti by the international community. International pledges to support Haiti in the 1990s and in the present decade have yet to

materialize, they argue, and the expectation is that if the problems of the country can be kept out of the headlines, then the neglect will not be a glaring issue. There is much truth to this prevalent view, and President Clinton's recent efforts to jumpstart international pledges to invest in Haiti and to deliver on previous assistance promises is evidence of this neglect. Yet, this view that Haiti has been neglected runs counter to the fear of foreign intervention, which is the only vehicle for the delivery of the tens of millions of dollars that have been pledged for the reconstruction of this country.

Keepers of Haitian Strategic Culture


In a previous section, the origins of Haitian Strategic Culture were discussed at length, and various factors were noted which have prevailed and continue to influence the course of Haitian history. Thus, while historical, structural and cultural conditions gave rise to Haitian Strategic Culture, such factors have also contributed to its permanence. In this section, our goal is not to reiterate the broad discussion provided above, but to focus on two dimensions that are crucial to the continuity of Haitian Strategic Culture.

The first dimension has to do with elites, the State, and its role in both the formation and the deepening of traditional Haitian Strategic Culture. Many contemporary references to Haiti argue that it represents one of the unique instances of a failed state. This argument is based on the assumption that, at one point in history, Haiti had a functioning State capable of performing duties such as providing security to its citizens from foreign and domestic threats, delivering basic services throughout the geographic expanse of the country, and directing the course of public policy. As we noted earlier, this assumption is farfetched since it is only possible to point to very brief periods in Haitian history when specific governments were able to use State power to perform these basic but critical functions. In short, Haiti is more a profound case of an incomplete State than a failed one. The incomplete State has involved the formation of an elite that is detached, outward looking, and seeking to satisfy self-interest as opposed to having any conception of a genuine, functional notion of a Haitian "public interest."

The components of an incomplete State include the inability of the elite within the State to conduct three basic functions, that is, to exert control over its geographic territory; to provide basic national and citizen security; and to conduct basic public and

economic policy. In Haiti, the failure of the political elite to perform these functions has been a recurrent pattern with serious consequences for the country's development. The consequences are far reaching, as is illustrated in the following graph. The absence of control over national territory has led to a complete lack of sovereignty since State institutions have no presence at the Dominican Republic's border and have even less control over the seas that surround the country. Not surprisingly, the massive flow of Haitians into the Dominican Republic and onto small boats that carry them to other shores cannot possibly be contained with the few institutional resources available. This situation also translates into the inability to enforce customs laws or any other function that constitutes a normal duty in a functioning state. The result is that Haitian elites have, in a sense, surrendered these duties to others, especially Dominican authorities who have to assume the roles that the absence of a Haitian State forces them to perform.

Haiti's Incomplete State



Historically, the Haitian elite has been incapable of designing, conducting, and implementing basic public and economic policies. This has directly translated into fewer, or poorer quality services such as water, electricity, health, education, and social programs. Not surprisingly, the average Haitian believes that the political elites who control the State are not only predatory, but that nothing positive comes from a direct relationship with these governing elites. Moreover, the State has also demonstrated an historical incapacity to conduct basic fiscal and monetary policy resulting primarily in the absence of long-term policies that might guide Haitian development by competently regulating the economy. The unintended consequence of this dual failure to conduct

public and economic policy has been a persistent dependence on both extensive foreign assistance and, more recently, the flow of remittances from Haitians living abroad.

According to the Central Bank, Haitians abroad send home a billion dollars a year, and the flow of remittances reaches the entire country. Nearly half of all remittances go to rural Haiti. Remittances in 2008 alone represented 30% of Haiti's GDP, which is more than three times the amount registered in 1998, during a fiscal period when remittances made up only 8.7% of the GDP. Taken together with foreign assistance, nearly two-thirds of Haiti's GDP is derived from these two sources alone. A sudden downturn in either one could bode yet another disaster for Haiti.

A final characteristic of Haiti's incomplete State involves the security sector. We have noted throughout this paper that, at least since 1844, the focus of security has been internal and the armed forces have been used primarily to discipline society internally rather than to defend the country from foreign threats. Even in the context of apparent Dominican acts of hostility, the Haitian armed forces were incapable of maintaining a defensive posture.

In the 1990s, owing to the corruption of the armed forces and the prevalent threat to civilian-elected rulers, the armed forces were formally abolished and the security sector was left in the hands of a new police force that was to be constructed under the mentorship of the United Nations. Between 1996 and 2004, the new police force failed to become an effective institution capable of insuring some semblance of citizen security for all Haitians. Instead, the new police force fell prey to corruption and proved insufficient to control former military officers, criminal gangs, and others who ransacked the country at will. In the end, not only was foreign intervention warranted, but under MINUSTAH, yet another new police force had to be constituted.

In contemporary Haiti, the State has no real capacity to provide national security so that it is indeed vulnerable to any sort of foreign threat. Presently, no country constitutes a threat to Haiti, but given the porous nature of the State's borders, it has become a very significant transshipment point for South American drug traffickers and to other forms of organized crime. Given this situation, modern-day Haiti relies entirely on the United States to provide it with the resources necessary to protect its borders and shores from drug trafficking. To some measure, it also depends on the Dominican


authorities to conduct this role, but, given the prevalence of corruption in the Dominican armed forces, the flow of drugs and contraband across the border is steady. The situation is such that Dominican officials often lament the abolition of the Haitian armed forces, arguing that the bombardment of drugs and immigrants is a direct consequence.

With the assistance of MINUSTAH, Haiti is gradually developing a capacity to provide citizens with some degree of security. This is an overall positive trend; however, it may not necessarily be a cause for premature celebration since the role currently performed by MINUSTAH is the functional equivalent of the one conducted by the UN in the 1990s and the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century. In other words, the incapacity of the Haitian State to guarantee citizen security has led to a recurrent pattern of foreign intervention to conduct that role. It seems that this will continue to be the case for the foreseeable future.

In short, the incomplete nature of the Haitian State has a direct impact on the persistence of a consistent Haitian Strategic Culture. Given this reality, it is unlikely that, in a short period of time (and accompanied by foreign assistance), Haiti will muster enough institutional strength to enable the State to conduct even basic activities. It is also unlikely that Haitian Strategic Culture will change dramatically in response to the actions of the United Nations and the international community.

Challenges, Continuity, and Change in Haitian Strategic Culture

Haiti finds itself in a state of permanent crisis, and Haitians in general perceive that the future holds nothing but uncertainty for them. The formative cultural, historical, political, and economic factors that influence and comprise Haitian Strategic Culture reveal a fatalistic view that essentially translates into a deep-seated notion that change is unlikely. For instance, Haitian distrust of the State and its institutions, the elite, and their suspicion of foreign intervention is unlikely to disappear in the near or far future. The history of Haiti suggests that when the government does indeed act, rather than solving problems it tends to exacerbate them. Still, Haitians are trapped in the paradox that while the State is weak, it is the only hope that they have of solving their problems.



With increasing poverty, inequality, and lack of opportunity, Haitians are unlikely to view the future with hope. Haiti is thus likely to continue dealing with profound crises of faith in the political and economic elite, individualism, anger, loss of control, feelings of insecurity and fear, distrust, and numerous forms of internal and external aggression. In this sense, the perception is that Haiti suffers not from a temporal transitory situation that is being addressed by international assistance and remittances—which together make up the bulk of the nation’s gross domestic product—but rather suffers from a perpetual transition that was never completed after 1804. The overall sense is that Haiti suffers from a permanent condition that will not be ameliorated in the near future, and that Haiti must brace itself for another prolonged period of foreign intervention. To compound angst, history also suggests that once foreigners depart, Haiti will revert to authoritarianism, personalistic dictatorship, and the continued exploitation and brutalization of the masses.

The resulting political vacuum that exists in Haiti is characterized by the inability of current leaders to effectively address this prevalent sentiment. Institution building with foreign support that will translate into effective governance is a long-term gamble, and one that most Haitians, given their daily preoccupation with survival, see only as a remote abstraction that concerns foreigners and the Haitian elite. How to fill this political vacuum in the short-term is the most significant question facing contemporary Haiti. Periodic elections to fill parliamentary posts provide a glimpse of the apathy of the

electorate to democratic processes that could ostensibly produce leaders to steer them out of their current despair. Upcoming national elections will probably attract a greater number of voters, yet it is unlikely that Haiti's next president will be able to effectively address the issues that have plagued the nation since 1804.

Within the context of the present political, social, and economic realities that define Haitian identity and Strategic Culture, Haitians are faced with three immediate and dramatic choices. The first option involves brooking a continued and massive foreign presence that is likely to persist for the foreseeable future, at least until conditions permit an honorable departure. Some scholars have suggested that Haiti's viability is possible only with the prolonged and indefinite supervision of the international community. At the moment, this appears to be the direction that Haiti is following. Haiti was under direct UN supervision between 1994 and 2000, and has been under MINUSTAH supervision since 2004; Haiti has governed itself for only four out of the past fifteen years.

The second option available to Haitians is to immigrate to whatever destination is possible, even if their conditions will only mildly improve when compared to the non-existent prospects for prosperity and peace in Haiti. Thus, Haitians are leaving the country every day en masse, driven away in desperation by the impoverished and ever-worsening conditions at home, attracted to better opportunities and supported by relatives who have already made the transition from Haiti to a "better life."

Finally, those who cannot immigrate are the ones who are apathetic about the overall situation at home and who are succumbing to the established and familiar practice of *maroonage* so aptly described by Robert Fatton.²⁸ This form of particularistic withdrawal that enabled Haitians to resist dictatorships in the past by patiently abiding undesirable circumstances with the hope that things will improve without having to take a proactive role in effectuating changes, is serving to further insulate Haitians from any possibility of substantively altering the present actualities that are suffocating the polity.

²⁸ Robert Fatton, "Haiti: *Habitus* and Strategic Culture," paper prepared for Haiti Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, August 6, 2009.

About the Authors

Eduardo A. Gamarra received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Pittsburgh in 1987. He has been affiliated with Florida International University since 1986 and he is the former director of the Latin American and Caribbean Center, professor of political science, and the editor of *Hemisphere*, a magazine on Latin American and Caribbean affairs. He is the author, co-author, and editor of several books including *Revolution and Reaction: Bolivia 1964-1985* (Transaction Publishers, 1988); three volumes of the *Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record* (Holmes and Meier Press); *Latin American Political Economy in the Age of Neoliberal Reform* (Lyne Rienner Publishers 1994); *Democracy Markets and Structural Reform in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico* (Lyne Rienner Publishers, 1995); and *Entre la Droga y la Democracia* (Freiderich Ebert Foundation, 1994). The author of over fifty articles on Latin America and the Caribbean, he has testified in the US Congress on drug policy toward Latin America.

Over the course of the last fifteen years, Dr. Gamarra has been a consultant to multilateral agencies, the Library of Congress, foundations, and government agencies throughout the hemisphere. He has lectured on issues ranging from narcotics trafficking and US Latin American policy to democratization and structural reform at universities throughout the United States, Canada, the Caribbean, Latin America, and Europe. He has been quoted in various periodicals ranging from *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Wall Street Journal* to *El Tiempo de Bogota*, *El Mercurio de Chile*, and *La Razon de La Paz*, Bolivia. His current research focuses on the political economy of narcotics trafficking, problems of democratization, and civil-military relations in the Andean region and the Caribbean. Most recently, Dr. Gamarra has been working on US policy toward Colombia and is directing a project on the Colombian migration to the United States.

Brian Fonseca's academic background is International Relations and International Business specifically in both Latin American and Chinese studies. Mr. Fonseca has attended Florida International University in Miami, Florida; Sichuan University in Chengdu, People's Republic of China; and most recently a graduate of National Defense University's Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies' Advanced Transnational Security, Stability and Democracy Program. He has authored various reports for United States Southern Command to include his 2008/09 publications *Energy Outlook: Brazil; Emerging Relationships: Iran & Latin America; Emerging Relationships: China and Latin America; Identifying Opportunities for U.S.-Cuba Military Cooperation*; and "Human Smuggling and the Terrorist-Criminal Nexus." Mr. Fonseca authored a chapter titled "Globalização e Contrabando de Seres Humanos no Hemisfério Occidental" in the recently published book *Segurança E Governança Nas Américas* (Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, 2009). In 2008/09, he presented at several institutions, including the Department of Defense in Washington DC on Iran's growing ties to Latin America. At Florida International University, Mr. Fonseca has co-taught Energy and Environmental Policy Issues and is currently lecturing on International Relations of Latin America and Contemporary Problems in International Relations. Mr. Fonseca has overseen, as the Principle Investigator (PI), the 2007, 2008, and 2009 editions of the Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium series. Currently, Mr. Fonseca oversees university research on strategic culture and its application in Latin America.

Brian Fonseca served in the United States Marine Corps from 1997-2004 and facilitated the training of several foreign military forces in both hostile theaters and during peace time operations. Brian Fonseca received several national awards recognizing his efforts and strategic thinking capabilities from the Secretary of the Navy.

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