

Cuban Strategic Culture

by Anthony Maingot

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FINDINGS REPORT

FIU

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The FIU-SOUTHCOM Academic Partnership Strategic Cultures Assessments

Florida International University's Applied Research Center (FIU ARC), in collaboration with the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and FIU's Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC), has recently formed the FIU-SOUTHCOM Academic Partnership. The partnership entails FIU providing the highest quality research-based knowledge to further explicative understanding of the political, strategic, and cultural dimensions of state behavior and foreign policy. This goal will be accomplished by employing a strategic culture approach. The initial phase of strategic culture assessments consists of a year-long research program that focuses on developing a standard analytical framework to identify and assess the strategic culture of ten Latin American countries. FIU will facilitate professional presentations of the following ten countries over the course of one year: Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina. In addition, a findings report on the impact of Islam and Muslims within Latin America will be produced.

The overarching purpose of the project is two-fold: to generate a rich and dynamic base of knowledge pertaining to the political, social, and strategic factors that influence state behavior; and to contribute to SOUTHCOM's Socio-Cultural Dynamics (SCD) Program. Utilizing the notion of strategic culture, SOUTHCOM has commissioned FIU ARC to conduct country studies in order to explain how states comprehend, interpret, and implement national security policy vis-à-vis the international system.

SOUTHCOM defines strategic culture as follows: "the combination of internal and external influences and experiences – geographic, historical, cultural, economic, political and military – that shape and influence the way a country understands its relationship to the rest of the world, and how a state will behave in the international community." FIU will identify and expound upon the strategic and cultural factors that inform the rationale behind the perceptions and behavior of select states in the present political and security climate by analyzing demography, history, regional customs, traditions, belief systems, and other cultural and historical influences that have contributed to the development of a particular country's current security rationale and interpretation of national security.

To meet the stated goals, FIU ARC will host a series of professional workshops in Miami. These workshops bring subject matter experts from all over the US and Latin America together to explore and discuss a country's specific history, geography, culture, economic, political, and military climates vis-à-vis strategic culture. At the conclusion of each workshop, FIU publishes a findings report, which is presented at SOUTHCOM.

The following Cuba Findings Report, authored by Dr. Anthony Maingot, is the product of a working group held in Miami on July 9, 2009, which included 11 prominent academic and private sector experts in Cuban history, culture, geography, economics, politics, and military affairs.

The views expressed in this findings report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US Government, US Department of Defense, US Southern Command, FIU-ARC, or Florida International University.

On behalf of FIU-ARC, we wish to acknowledge and thank all of the participants for their contributions, which made the Cuban Strategic Culture workshop a tremendous success.

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Executive Summary

- Cuban strategic culture since the revolution, while resilient, is nevertheless being put under tremendous strain. The new security environment, enmeshed in a globalizing economy and interdependent society of states with common social and political values, is posing serious challenges to how security has been perceived in Cuba for the last 50 years.
- Raul Castro, as head of state, may in fact be amenable and/or forced to engage the US utilizing a different set of strategic culture premises that deviate from the Cold War mindset that defines revolutionary strategic culture under Fidel Castro.
- The current regime is faced with the serious possibility of having to compromise ideology when it comes to ensuring economic wellbeing and security for the state.

Geographic and Historical Influences on Strategic Culture

- Geographically and geopolitically, Cuba and the US (and the state of Florida in particular) have been joined at the hip. The US has assumed an instrumental role in Cuban affairs since 1898, and the Castro regime has proffered a specific ideological interpretation of the extensive historical relationship—based, in part, on geo-political proximity—between Cuba and the US
- New environmental consciousness in the US and the prospects of Cuban offshore drilling in the Straits of Florida have added to geo-economic concerns. An intense new effort to allow drilling on the Continental Platform off Florida is now also part of the mix.

Keepers of Strategic Culture

- Contemporary Cuba is characterized by a growing gap between the strategic culture of the elite and the political culture of much of the population. The youth and the intellectuals are the most disaffected.
- Negotiations with Cuba will be difficult because the revolutionary elite has exacerbated Cuban nationalism and anti-Americanism—always present in some form—to the extent that making concessions to the US is portrayed by that elite as surrendering national honor and sovereignty.
- The military, under Raul Castro, with the support of the bureaucracy and its accoutrements, remains the perpetuators of the revolution and of revolutionary strategic culture based on notions of struggle, resistance, and fierce nationalism.

Enduring Rivalries and Challenges

- The dire economic conditions and the increasing role of Cuba's highly professional military in the economy compel observers to wonder how long the strident strategic culture of the past five decades can last. Cuban economists regard the Venezuelan oil deliveries as a lifeline and not in any way contributing to Cuba's productive capabilities.
- Agricultural decline has meant that Cuba imports 80% of its food from the US, a fact Cuban intellectuals see as all the more reason to do two things—liberate state-held land and open a line of negotiations with the US government on technical assistance.

- Cuba's strategic alliance with Venezuela-led ALBA is fast presenting its leadership with a dilemma because of the very evident crises in virtually all the member countries of ALBA.

Change and Continuity in Cuban Strategic Culture

- Cuban strategic culture remains offensive, nationalist, and wary of US intentions. Engagement between Cuba and the US requires substantive change in Cuba-US perceptions as well as change in US-Cuba perceptions.
- The military remains the most stable, organized, and relevant actor in a post-Fidel Castro Cuba. With Raul Castro in power, it is difficult to see the military initiating any radical domestic changes in the current socio-political context.
- If there is regime change, then it will have to be a Cuban affair.

Introduction

It is difficult to think of a longer-lasting enmity than that which has existed since 1959 between Cuba and the United States (US). It can be argued that neither the US nor Cuban elites ever fully implemented a strategy of “flexible response.” Adamancy and inflexibility on both sides has been the rule, though one has to admit this was more consistently a Cuban stance than an American one. The explanation is rather simple and straightforward: Over the past 50 years, the US has had Chief Executives as different in foreign policy style as Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, and Bill Clinton. Cuba has had one absolute Executive: Fidel Castro. It is an impressive record. Castro has stood firm against nine US presidents and, judging from his recent columns in *Granma*, appears determined to stymie any flexibility toward the tenth.

During those 50 years, the US has sponsored dozens of covert operations against Fidel Castro as well as an open invasion by CIA-trained exiles, faced a potentially catastrophic nuclear stand-off, and stood helpless while Cuba unleashed a horde of refugees onto US soil, some 20,000 of whom were criminals and inmates of mental asylums. The US fought a militarily incompetent battle against Cuban reservist workers in Grenada, contributed to the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile, helped track down Ché Guevara in Bolivia, and trained Contras in Nicaragua. It has been a war, in and out of the shadows, so pervasive and challenging that it has engendered some of the classics in the study of foreign policy decision-making, such as Irvin L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (1962), Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decisions* (1971), and John Lewis Gaddis’s *Strategies of Containment* (1982).

These are the realities that put the study of Cuban strategic culture in a distinct category. Since **strategic culture** refers to the thinking of the elite—as distinct from the political culture of the broader society—one understands the value of the questions asked by another scholar who spent much time studying the Cuban case: Robert Jervis. In his influential book, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Jervis directly addresses the question of the formation of the strategic culture of any elite:

How . . . do statesmen come to develop their images of other actors? What evidence do they pay most attention to? What makes them perceive threat? Under what conditions do they think that the other, although hostile, has only limited objectives?¹

And crucially, at this time of transition in both the US and Cuba, “What kinds of behavior are most apt to change an established image”? These are all critical questions that the strategic culture approach of this Report attempts to answer. In the final analysis, reasonable people on both sides of the Straits of Florida have to consider that after 50 years, it is time to make a good-faith effort to answer two questions: First, how do you judge the effectiveness or futility of a foreign policy strategy, and following that, if futile, how do you change it . . . on both sides of the Straits?

Geography: Geopolitics and Geoeconomics

If geography is indeed destiny, then Florida and Cuba have been joined at the hip for centuries. Spanish Florida was governed from Havana, which was the main transshipment port for the whole of colonial Spanish America. When Miami was formally incorporated as a city in 1898, having fewer than 500 voters, Havana was the seigniorial city of what remained of the Spanish Empire. It remained “*la isla siempre fiel*” for nearly a century after the rest of the colonies chose independence. When Cuba finally launched her protracted and bloody wars of independence (1868-1878, 1895-1898), South Florida played important roles: 1 - receiving Cuban cigar makers in Key West and Tampa and 2 - sending US troops and the Navy to do battle in Cuba. Even before Cuba was freed from Spanish rule, it was attractive to US investments, particularly in sugar and as builders of its infrastructure. Henry Flagler would spend a fortune—in fact, close to what the Panama Canal cost—building the railroad bridge from Miami to Key West in order to make Cuba more accessible to US exports and tourists. The same “90 miles” that separated Key West from Cuba then, separated it in 1959 when revolution

¹Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 31.

on the island gave the cliché “90 miles from the US” an ominous meaning. This stands as a testament to the fact that while geography remains constant, cartographical thinking tends to follow geopolitics. Flagler might have had trade in mind, but Alfred Mahon saw it in terms of sea routes for that trade and the need for bases to defend them. Both Flagler and Mahon highlighted the importance of Cuba’s geographic proximity to the US.

That said it would be shortsighted to an extreme to continue to restrict one’s understanding of Cuba’s geographic position in terms of a traditional or Cold War geopolitical frame of mind. Consider some probable developments in this geographical area where the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Atlantic intersect.

The location of ports in South Florida and in Cuba means that in a post-embargo and post-socialist situation, these ports will be competing with each other for all the activities a globalized economy brings with it. In the case of Cuba, the ports of Mariel and Matanzas will probably become the trade ports, and Havana will be open to the fast-growing cruise ship industry. In the specific case of Mariel, Brazil has already advanced a \$300 million credit to modernize the facilities and extend road and railroad connections. With Brazil beginning to exploit its own offshore oil fields and investing in exploration of offshore Cuba, Mariel is being prepared to be a major transshipment port. This brings us to arguably the most important geographical dimension presently unfolding: the exploitation of Cuba’s offshore oil and gas deposits. Will the very active involvement of not just Brazil but Russia in this exploration lead to a revision of the present US policy of restricting drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf, especially in Florida and Alaska? Will the known pressure from US oil interests be the decisive force that brings down the embargo and opens up Cuba? What, additionally, are the military implications of such activities in a contiguous zone already warranting the presence of a major US military installation?

New environmental and ecological concerns are also modifying perceptions of existing spaces. Cuba, with 3,500 Km. of coastline hugged by 4,200 islands, keys, and coral reefs, is the richest island in terms of biodiversity in the Caribbean, and the Gulf Stream brings much of this to Florida and, indeed, all the way up the Eastern Coast of the US. Much of this is still pristine...but for how much longer? Cuba has not been a

scrupulous guardian of its environment. The Council of Hemispheric Affairs revealed in June of 2009 that Cuba dumps 113.5 billion gallons of water contaminated with both urban and agricultural pollutants into the Atlantic Ocean every year, and 3.27 billion gallons of this goes into its rivers. Judging from the pollution coming from present-day drilling offshore Matanzas, one has to worry about the plans for oil and gas exploration on the Cuban side of the Bay of Florida.

All this is to say that the future of these “90 miles” appears to be as much a matter for US definitions of its military security as it is for the new national and worldwide concerns about ecology and the environment, and how they relate to the drastic need to become more energy self-sufficient. Geography, defined in this fashion, focuses the mind on the dire need for a comprehensive, holistic new paradigm in US-Cuban relations. Focusing on Cuban strategic culture is one step toward building that new paradigm.

Strategic Culture: An Operational Definition

Broadly defined, “strategic culture” is the combination of internal and external influences and experiences—geographic, historical, cultural, economic, political, and military—that shape and influence *the way “a country” understands its relationship to the rest of the world*. Since speaking of “a country” is in fact an anthropomorphism, one has to clarify that it is an elite that “shapes and influences” the country. This is especially critical when we are speaking of an authoritarian (perhaps even totalitarian) state, which is what Cuba has been for half a century. More specifically, therefore, this Report focuses on the range of political and military experiences that shape a country’s **elite** ideological and strategic choices, which is what ultimately reveals its strategic culture. Establishing the latter should help the analyst anticipate how those elite might react to future situations. The concept of **political culture** refers to the broader set of societal attitudes toward the symbols and the holders of elite positions. What engenders attitudes and behavior toward authority generally, and the holders of authority specifically? In other words, what engenders the people’s subjective orientation to politics? A fundamental research question is: To what extent are the strategic culture and the political culture in Cuba, if not coterminous, at least in some form of harmonious alignment? This is the first

approximation to the question of degrees of legitimacy of any system. This brings us to an *important preliminary caveat*: As distinct from all the other case studies in the Project, Cuba is especially difficult to study because it had a fundamental institutional rupture in governance 50 years ago and has evolved into a truly “Closed Society.” For all this time there has not been a US embassy in Havana, the crucial “listening post” in international affairs. We have had 50 years of misperceptions and dashed hopes and, if nothing else, this compels us to be systematic and empirical rather than prescriptive in our approach. Being systematic involves distinguishing those parts of the strategic culture that can be established empirically, and that help us construct a useful and strategically operational understanding of the elite’s decision-making, past, present, and, most critically, future ones.

This approach leads us to ask the following type of questions:

- [1] What are the elements (worldviews, ideologies) in the elite’s strategic culture?
How are these related to the wider societal political culture?
- [2] How are decisions empirically traceable to a strategic culture made—single-handedly by the charismatic leader, or by a combination of charisma and legal-rational institutional inputs?
- [3] What “shocks and challenges” (internal and external) weigh on the elite’s worldview and choices?
- [4] What are some indications of elite innovation and/or new directions?

A Necessary Historical Fact: Cuban Nationalism

The study of the long-term consequences of dramatic events in a society’s history is not new. Nor is the study of nationalism as it relates to the formation of both a strategic culture and a broader political culture. Consider the words of John Stuart Mill:

The strongest cause for the feeling of nationality ... is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history and consequent community of

recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past²

Mill's analysis is seconded by considerable contemporary social science scholarship. Stereotyping, i.e., the way we define "the other," says Michael Pickering, is related to the experiences of a nation's past, to issues of racial hierarchization, power, and authority "in the context of nation-building, colonialism, and imperialism."³

C. Wright Mills once warned his students not to use history as a mere "backdrop" to the main analysis. The historical narrative chosen should be made an integral part of the whole. To achieve that, "history" has to be disaggregated and the parts made part of the explanation of the formation of any strategic culture. To this end, we have separated the economic history (see Appendix "A") from the evolution of Cuban nationalism. It should be understood that economics has always been a significant part of the Cuban elite's image of their overall "dependence" and even "subjugation." Within this, however, there has always been a pluralism of voices on how to break with this dependence. Although muted by the Castro regime, dissension on economic policy has been a major factor in Cuban intellectual circles.

Understanding the heuristic value of separating economics from politics, Cuban "history" is most productively focused on the critical role played by Cuban nationalism. Consider the following unique features of that history:

[1] Cuba remained a Spanish colony for close to a century after the liberation of mainland Latin America. Because it remained "loyal" ("*La isla siempre fiel*"), and received many refugees and much capital from the Spanish-American colonies, Cuban nationalism developed at a slow boil, but persistently.

[2] Cuban nationalism revealed itself with explosive intensity in the 10-Year War (1868-1878) and even more so with the Cuban War of National Liberation. During that half-century of struggle, the island witnessed the rise of an exceptionally gifted intelligentsia, whose writings fed nationalist

² John Stuart Mill, *Representative Government*, 1861.

³ Michael Pickering, *Stereotyping: The Politics of Representation* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p.xii.

sentiments. Emeterio S. Santovenia, hardly a radical historian, explains how Cuban nationalism had reached maturity by the end of the 19th Century and kept growing through the influence of the “illustrated” class, many, if not all, based in the prestigious University of Havana: “*El sector medio,*” he tells us, “*se inspira en un nacionalismo romántico, que se manifiesta en un anti-imperialismo rétorico y plasma en medidas de protección económica.*”⁴

[3] Cuba is the only Latin American country whose struggle for independence was ended through a foreign intervention. One should always keep in mind that there were no Cuban representatives at the Treaty of Paris, which ended the “Spanish-American” War. Neither the Cuban Liberation Army (the *Mambises*) nor the Cuban flag were permitted to march in the Victory March in Santiago. The fact that some 80% of the Cuban soldiers were black might have had something to do with the prohibition. The race issue was certainly already present in Cuban elite circles as Fred Quintana explains,⁵ but this slight added the American seal of approval to the race “question,” which broke into open violence in 1912 and 1933 and is very much an issue in contemporary Cuba.

[4] Not only was the Cuban Constitution (the most evident product of a nation’s sovereign will) challenged by US demands (viz. The Platt Amendment), major parts of the Cuban territory were carved out. As Jorge Rodríguez Beruff points out, Cuban nationalism surged as Cubans opposed demands for not just Guantanamo, but Bahia Honda, Cienfuegos, Nipe, and even Trascornia right across Havana Harbor.⁶ The so-called “revolution” of 1933-1934 (which many believe was the precursor to 1959) was justified on the basis of reclaiming Cuban Sovereignty and “national honor,” as so

⁴ Emeterio S. Santovenia and Raúl M. Shelton, *Cuba y su historia* Tomo III, 2nd Edition (Miami: Cuba Corporation, 1965), p. 223. Two of the contributors to this Report engage in an interesting debate. Damian Fernandez believes that Cubans are driven by “prepotency” and a “will to grandeur.” Uva de Aragon sees these attributes as only one side of the coin, the other side being a simple honesty and simplicity.

⁵ Fred Quintana, “Race and the Revolution,” paper prepared for Cuba Report.

⁶ Jorge Rodríguez Beruff, “US Bases and Strategic Culture in Cuba,” Paper for Cuba Workshop, August 18, 2009.

many Cuban historians have described it. Even after the events of 1934, when parts of Cuba's nationalist grievances were satisfied, and the wholesale dismantling of US bases throughout the Greater Caribbean occurred, Cuba remains the only Latin American country with a foreign base in its territory. Despite ideological interpretations, the geopolitical fact is that the presence has provided a historical basis for articulating Cuban strategic culture.

In many ways, Cuba can be said to represent the classical case that illustrates how US-Cuba relations have influenced the development of regional strategic culture, and Cuba's strategic culture in particular. A representative case is that of President Dwight Eisenhower, who, in 1957, fully two years before he authorized the overthrow of the recently installed Cuban revolutionary government, wrote the following to Senator Hubert Humphrey:

It is my personal conviction that almost anyone of the newborn states of the world would far rather embrace communism or any other form of dictatorship than to acknowledge the political domination of another government even though that brought to each citizen a far higher standard of living⁷

It appears that the Eisenhower-Nixon government ignored the previous half-century of US-Cuban relations. Modern nationalism, that "state of mind" embedded in the "living and active corporate will" as Hans Kohn defined it,⁸ is not easily grasped, much less measured for policy purposes by external actors. That is something that is known intuitively and unquestionably by all politically conscious members of the society and is a matter of heart, not of fact.⁹ It is a minority position that nationalism and its associated ideas and symbols are invented traditions, exercises in social engineering,

⁷ Cited in, John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 181.

⁸ Hans Kohn, *Nationalism* (New York: D.Van Nostrand Co., 1955), p. 9.

⁹ See the essays by Clifford Geertz and Walker Conner in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (ed.), *Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991).

strategically chosen for purposes of political aggrandizement.¹⁰ This leads one to challenge Brian Latell's argument that Fidel Castro became an ardent nationalist relatively late in his political career and for instrumental, political reasons. According to Latell, Castro was a *tabula rasa* when he entered the University of Havana: having "no framework, no motivating sensibility, no intellectual or ideological foundation."¹¹ Up to that point he had been exposed to "little to no nationalist sentiment." Since he already had "heroic aspirations," he had to find the right political formula. He went back and forth in his interests. "The issues he would champion," says Latell, "the causes he would pursue could be grafted on later as opportunities might allow."¹² Finally, he found the right formula in José Martí, Castro's "surest way to fame and glory." Described this way, Castro fits what Max Weber calls the actor driven by "goal-oriented rationality": one instrumentally and selectively choosing means calculated to be appropriate to chosen goals.¹³

This was certainly true at the level of choosing an immediate political message. It omits, however, the broader context of a history of nationalism in which Martí was the iconic figure. Had Castro's ideas been so contrived, his political motives would have been easier to read, which, we know quite well, they were not at all. Castro's behavior was not some simple and monumental Machiavellian capacity for dissimulation but was behavior that was also characterized by "value-oriented" rationality, described by Weber as conduct that is unintelligibly instinctual, sensory, emotional, and passionate. It is this value-oriented rationality that characterizes the nationalist and that Damian Fernandez has analyzed with such lucidity.¹⁴ Hence, a strategic culture approach fleshes out this profound and formative variable, that is, nationalism, when analyzing security policy. Whatever his search for a political formula, the one thing that is predictable about this and any other nationalist is that Castro believed that his nation should be independent,

¹⁰ See, for instance, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (ed.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp.13-14.

¹¹ Brian Latell, *After Fidel* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 79ff. This is arguably the single most important study on the Cuban elite and Raúl Castro specifically.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 79.

¹³ See H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p.122 ff.

¹⁴ Damian J. Fernandez, *Cuba: The Politics of Passion* (Austin: University of Texas Press, -----) as well as his contribution to this Report.

secure, and prestigious among all states.¹⁵ Value-oriented rationality tells us nothing specific about ideology but a lot about emotions and sentiments. Keep in mind that Cuba is a Caribbean country and, as a result, many there have the ability to sustain a fairly permanent **national identity**, rooted in the political socialization process, even as they pursue multiple **identifications**—a more cognitive, ideological process.¹⁶

Latell's claim that Cuban history was "woefully bereft of truly unifying national heroes"¹⁷ might be true in terms of a national political project but not in terms of a national identity and political culture. Hadn't the "character" and "spirit" of the Cuban people and the spirited nationalism of leaders such as José Martí, Manuel Sanguily, the Maceo brothers, Juan Gualberto Gómez, Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, Enrique José Varona, and Manuel Márquez Sterling, let alone that of virtually everyone of the Generation of 1930, laid the nationalist groundwork for 1959? As Hugh Thomas has recorded, Cuban nationalism did not emerge in a void; it sprang from "over close experiences" with colonialism and imperialism, that is, external interference in Cuban affairs.¹⁸ It is good, thus, to follow the rule that as goes nationalism, so goes the nationalist.

As factual as are the reality of Cuban nationalism and of the real role it has always played in Cuban strategic culture, it is also a fact that Cuban elites have always manipulated the figures and symbols of this nationalism. The life and thought of José Martí have clearly been so used.

Martí's views on the Americans were adopted selectively by all who wished to protest the "ethnocentrism" supposedly evident in US-Cuba relations.¹⁹ José Martí understood 19th century Anglo-Saxon racism very well. "They believe," he wrote, "in the incomparable superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race over the Latin one They believe that the Hispanic American peoples are composed principally of Indians and blacks." He

¹⁵ See the summary of definitions of nationalism in Boyd C. Shafer, *Nationalism: Myth and Reality* (New York: Harvest Book, 1955), pp. 3-11.

¹⁶ Further on this in Anthony P. Maingot, "National Identity, instrumental Identifications, and the Caribbean's Culture of 'Play'," *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research*, (2 [2] 2002), pp.115-124.

¹⁷ Latell, p. 90.

¹⁸ Thomas, *Cuba* p. 1346.

¹⁹ This section draws heavily from Anthony P. Maingot, *The US and Caribbean: Challenges of an Asymmetrical Relationship* (London: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 8, 9, and 228.

understood the consequences of this for his country's relations with the US. "A people who disdain another," he wrote in 1892, "is a dangerous friend." He lived in America for 15 years (1880-1895) and admired much of the country; he also distrusted many American attitudes and motivations, especially what he perceived as racial haughtiness. "Do you believe," he asked rhetorically, "that a country, strong and very self-satisfied with its supremacy and which loathes the race they conquered ... will treat as equals and recognize the sovereignty of a small society of heterogeneous populations which includes a large number of those of the abhorred race?"

But those who used—and misused—Martí to knock the Americans tended to ignore or disregard a fundamental aspect of Martí's geopolitical thought: that leaders had to transcend such sentiments for the simple reason that friendly relations with the US were going to be indispensable to an independent Cuba. The first step in the process of dealing with the US was to study its system. "It is necessary to study [the US]," he warned, "so as not to stumble upon her." The next step—and in this he demonstrated a clear-headed understanding of asymmetrical relationships—had to be putting your own house in order.

"Liberty without hatreds" was José Martí's recommendation on 17 April, 1884, for the theme of the Cuban Revolutionary Party. As was noted in the Introduction, Martí argued for a working relationship with the US. He did not argue for a "special relationship" such as the US had with Great Britain. That special relationship was based on common race, language, and institutions; attributes Cuba did not share with the US. Martí argued, instead, for a *strategic* relationship: a pragmatic and sincere search for those interests that Cuba and the US had in common, and the possible synergies that could come from that. Certainly a love of liberty was one such shared interest, though not always defined in the same terms.

Despite this awareness, however, two very powerful forces militate to make the path recommended by Martí difficult. First is the weight of history. The burden of past foreign interference in Cuba's affairs, especially as that behavior offended national and ethnic pride, is not readily overlooked. This is especially the case when it combines with the second contentious element, enormous asymmetries in power—military and

economic—with Cuba’s neighbor to the north. It is the latter especially that continues to be the overarching question in US-Cuba relations.

The Early Choices of the Charismatic Leader

Dispassionate observers differ on exactly when the nationalist, idealistic, even romantic phase of the 1959 revolution gave way to the militarized, dictatorial regime we recognize today. On the methodological principle that eyewitness accounts are more dependable sources than most, we cite three books by early sympathizers who, as socialists or at least social democrats, had extraordinary access to the elite in the first decade of the revolution.²⁰

First came the socialist agronomist René Dumont, whose 1964 book, *Cuba: socialisme et développement* noted three fundamental changes in Cuban revolutionary governance by 1962: [1] “hipercentralization,” [2] “bureaucratic chaos,” and [3] a “Manichean” moralism that classified any “deviation” as “counterrevolutionary,” “anti-social,” or simply “lumpen.” The romantic, idealistic sheen was gone, said Dumont, but the intensity of Cuban nationalism hid the growing authoritarianism from sight.

Next was K. S. Karol, another early socialist sympathizer, in his 1970 book *Guerrillas in Power*, in which he describes how, in 1968, Fidel Castro declared war to the death against homosexuals and other anti-socials; the heads of all who try to destroy the Revolution, said Castro, “will fall.” “The tone of this speech,” said Karol “was highly disturbing”; it marked a decisive departure from earlier, more idealistic tones, indicating the militarization, tighter police surveillance, and general intolerance with all and any dissent that has ensued.²¹

These two were followed by a book that, because of its depth and breadth, is now the “gold standard” of Cuban history: Hugh Thomas’s *Cuba*. Throughout, Thomas addresses the issue of Cuban nationalism, which was fine-tuned by exhortations from the government. “The government,” he says, “told the people so often that for the first time

²⁰ For an analysis of the first decade of writings on the Revolution see, Anthony P. Maingot, A Question of Methodology: Recent Literature on Cuba,” *Latin American Research Review*, XIII, No.1 (1978), pp.225-247.

²¹ K. S. Karol, *Guerrillas in Power* (New York, 1970), p. 448.

they could truly say ‘this is my own, my native land’ that, whether or not they required propaganda to make them think so, they believed it.” Nationalism acted as blinders to a changed reality, a reality Thomas described and decried with vehemence. “Those who admire the social advances made under the Revolution,” he advised, “must consider the brutality of the gaolers, the arbitrary character of an unpredictable but ubiquitous tyranny....”²²

Whether one places the crucial watershed in the early 1960s, or the mid- or late 1960s, there is general agreement that the intrinsic nature of the early nationalist and idealistic revolution had changed. Nationalism and the construction of a strategic culture based on antagonism with the US allowed the elite to retain a certain degree of legitimacy. One thing was clear: Charisma alone, as Edward Gonzalez argues in his 1974 book, *The Limits of Charisma*, was no longer enough. A full-blown authoritarian state machinery (much more of Lenin than of Marx) had been institutionalized. This is undoubtedly the core of the system, but it is not a sufficient explanation of Fidel Castro’s *modus operandi* and capacity to survive. Several established interpretations should be entertained.

The first interpretation portrays Fidel Castro as a “Machiavellian.” This argument is made with exceptional fervor by Guillermo Cabrera Infante, who knew him well and who maintains that Fidel Castro never really intended to negotiate, much less bargain, with the US. “...Fidel Castro’s real genius lies in the art of deception ... His true master is Machiavelli, in that he sees history as the manipulator who uses it as an instrument to control men, and politics . . . and reaching power.”²³

Similarly, Rufo López Fresquet, another early collaborator, argues that Fidel Castro is “a megalomaniac” who is never sincere; he has developed “the habit of dissimulation.”²⁴ “Castro,” wrote López Fresquet, “is a rebel, and he accepts no authority. He will always fight ... against Batista, against the Cuban community, against the US.” He also predicted—incorrectly, as it turned out—that “He will rebel against Russia.”

²² Hugh Thomas, *Cuba* (New York, 1971), p. 1483.

²³ Guillermo Cabrera Infante, p. xvi.

²⁴ Rufo López Fresquet, *My Fourteen Months with Castro* (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1966), p.188.

This assertion of “megalomania” leads us to the second widely held interpretation: that Fidel Castro was intrinsically (in the psychological sense) in such a state of mind that he was incapable of negotiating, much less bargaining. This interpretation, logically, nullifies the theory of Fidel Castro as Machiavellian—a posture requiring all the clear-headedness and *sang-froid* any negotiator must count on. The psychopathological interpretation holds that Fidel Castro, then and now, suffers from a mindset that resulted from a “hubris-nemesis complex.”²⁵ The main developer of this approach, David Ronfeldt of the RAND Corporation, defined his terms in greater detail:²⁶

Hubris = A pretension toward an arrogant form of godliness

Nemesis = A vengeful desire to confront, defeat, humiliate, and punish an adversary

Ronfeldt adds what has to be a very limp disclaimer: a hubris-nemesis leader is not considered crazy or irrational, or having a mental or personality disorder in a clinical sense; such an individual should not be considered a “psychopath” or “sociopath.”²⁷ Take the following Ronfeldt criteria of the “hubris” dimension, interpreted as “general grandiosity”:

Severe sensitivities about “pride,” “dignity,” “honor,” and “respect,” four words that are often raised by hubris-nemesis leaders when they voice their dreams of future glory and their memoirs of past insult and injury at the hands of others²⁸

The problem is that once such quasi-clinical observations of psychopathology are articulated, they are readily picked up by those wishing to make a facile case against an adversary. Brian Latell does not engage in such dangerous underestimation of him. He portrays Castro as a politician of “exceptional intelligence,” and one profoundly and

²⁵ Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt, *Castro, Cuba, and the World* (RAND Corp., 1986).

²⁶ David Ronfeldt, “Draft Chapters on Two Faces of Fidel: Don Quixote and Captain Ahab,” (RAND Corp., June 1990), p. 5.

²⁷ David Ronfeldt, *Beware the Hubris-Nemesis Complex*, (RAND Corp. 1994), p. 17.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

consistently studying his opponent, the US. “With the exception of a succession of Israeli leaders,” says Latell, “there is probably no other political figure anywhere in the world who has been more knowledgeable in assessing American politics and accurate in predicting American gyrations.”²⁹ Since there is considerable evidence that similar psychologistic interpretations have guided US actions off-and-on—and a good chance that they might be applied to his brother Raúl in due course—a critique is in order.

Are these hypersensitive notions of honor (*pundonor* or *amor propio*) not the “feelings of nationality” John Stuart Mill spoke of? Does not Salvador de Madariaga describe the Spaniard in cultural, not psychological terms, as a “man of honor” as distinct from the Englishman as “a man of fair play”? To make his point about the intensity of the Spanish sentiments of honor, dignity, and respect, de Madariaga quotes from the 17th Century Spanish playwright Calderón de la Barca’s tragedy, *El alcalde de Zalamea*: “*Al Rey la hacienda y la vida se ha de dar; pero el honor es patrimonio del alma: y el alma solo es de Dios.*”³⁰

As a Spaniard, de Madariaga might have romanticized a bit, but not so the American anthropologist and noted Latin-Americanist Frank Tannenbaum. He avoids any psychologizing when he points to the Latin American intellectual leader’s penchant for achieving “glory and grandeur” for themselves and their country. His analysis of this motivation is based on a detailed knowledge of the historical and cultural context of these leaders and of their relations with the US.³¹

Note how Rufo López Fresquet, in a moment of intellectual candor, has to admit that:

Castro is a freak, but he did not create himself. He is the fruit of Cuban soil. He was produced by immorality, cynicism, and irresponsibility, by the corrupt social, political, economic, and spiritual forces within Cuba. Castro was born in Cuba; he

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

³⁰ Cited in Salvador de Madariaga, *Ingléses, franceses, españoles* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1969), p. 24. Herbert L. Matthews, who knew Spain well, described Castro as “*muy español.*” *The Cuban Story* (New York: George Braziller, 1961), p.162.

³¹ Frank Tannenbaum, *Ten Keys to Latin America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), pp. 213-218.

was educated at Cuban schools; he participated in Cuban activities. Cuba is responsible for Castro's existence

Does all this mean that the break in US-Cuban relations stemmed from a fundamental clash of cultures and personalities? Maurice Halperin has best articulated this aspect of the clashing styles in the face-to-face meeting between Castro and Nixon, two nationalists: "How could one conduct businesslike negotiations with this arrogant, eccentric, and unpredictable young Cuban?"³² Certainly President Eisenhower, who had pointedly avoided Castro by going golfing, could not, nor could the fervently anti-communist Nixon, who had only recently been mobbed by angry throngs in Panama, Lima, and Caracas. Neither could the Cuban rebel, who, before he went into the Sierra Maestra, had spent time in Mexico among super nationalists and Marxists such as Ché Guevara, who had been in the Guatemala of 1954. Those years, along with the years up in the hills, had to have had their influence on the shaping of strategic culture in a man already disposed to visions of grandeur. Tad Szulc makes much of the clash of strategic cultures. "For all his anti-Americanism," says Szulc, "Castro had come to seek, consciously or not, North American approval for the person and the deeds of Fidel Castro...."³³ Little chance, says Szulc, since what characterized the meeting between Vice President Nixon and Castro was an "absolute lack of mutual understanding." Keep in mind that the meeting was not a simple exchange of pleasantries, since it lasted two hours and 25 minutes. Beyond cultural and personality styles, thus, there was a fundamental clash in strategic cultures, which went a long way in explaining the dramatic choices the charismatic leader made upon his return to Cuba. I know of no more authoritative and convincing affirmation of this assumption than Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s eyewitness account of US-Cuban relations in the early phases.³⁴ Even as he argues that Castro was more of 'a romantic, left-wing nationalist' than 'a communist or even a Marxist-Leninist,' he believes that as early as the spring of 1959, Castro seemed to have

³² Maurice Halperin, *The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 52.

³³ Tad Szulc, *Fidel: A Critical Portrait* (New York: William Morrow, 1986), p. 487.

³⁴ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (New York: Fawcett Premier Books, 1966).

decided to cast the United States in the role of enemy of the revolution.³⁵ Evidence of this was his disdainful treatment of US Ambassador Philip Bonsal, known to be sympathetic to many aspects of the revolution at that point. Schlesinger interpreted this to mean that Castro had little interest in a *rapprochement* with the US.

The strategic culture that endures to our day was thus established early on. Jorge Domínguez adds a specific angle to this thesis when he points out that the pressure from the radical wing (i.e., Ché and Raúl) of the revolutionary movement and from a mobilized labor movement pushed Fidel Castro to keep the US at arm's length.³⁶ Theodore Draper argues that Castro was “already inwardly committed to, and had prepared the way for, a break.” But, then, there is Draper's crucial query: “On the other hand,” he asserts, “only a US Government which had grossly miscalculated the forces at work or did not care any longer ... would have made the break so easy.”³⁷

Herein lies a lesson in strategy for our day. One who had an intimate acquaintance with the rise of Fidel Castro, Andres Suarez, quotes Reinhold Niebuhr's conclusion that “Arrogance is the inevitable consequence of the relation of power to weakness,” in order to make a fundamental point:

The serious aspect of the matter is not that this defect was present in US-Cuban relations, as it undoubtedly was, but that neither American public opinion nor the US government was capable of appreciating Cuban problems, of devoting to them the attention and time that they deserved, or even of contemplating with equanimity events that might result in a loss of prestige of the United States³⁸

This, of course, does not mean that Latin Americans generally, and Cubans specifically, have any fewer misconceptions about the US. What is true is precisely what Latell states: In general, their leadership and certainly their intelligence service, study this country in greater depth.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

³⁶ Jorge Domínguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1978), p.145.

³⁷ Theodore Draper, *Castroism: Theory and Practice* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p.144.

³⁸ Andres Suarez, *Cuba: Castroism and Communism* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967), p. 65.

So far, the analysis here, as in virtually all the massive literature on Cuba, focuses on Fidel Castro's definition of his country's strategic culture. With his illness and the formal shift to Raúl Castro's leadership, it is time to study whether he fits the same mold.

Changes in the Elites' Strategic Culture? Raúl and the Military Institution

Much of US policy has been driven by the idea that with the passing of the charismatic Fidel, the system would soon collapse. The persistence of this idea was succinctly recorded in the very thorough review of the literature by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress: "Many question whether Raúl has the **charisma and force of personality** that sustained his brother in power for so long."³⁹ What do we know about the leadership qualities of the "uncharismatic" Raúl Castro, and where might the basis of his support be?

The etymology of the word charisma is clear: it is Greek for "gift of grace," and it expresses an ages-old belief that "history" is driven by the actions of "heroic" or "great" men. But there is another, much more prosaic interpretation. "In traditional Chinese historiography" writes Derek Bodde, "a rebel who succeeds in founding a new dynasty is *ipso facto* a great man, whereas one who fails to do so is portrayed as a mere "bandit."⁴⁰ Here we have the first source of historical "greatness": achieving power. Charisma helps the achievement of power during periods of crisis when there exists what Irvine Schifter calls "a rescue-hungry people."⁴¹ Thus, in sociological theory, charisma is not seen as purely an intrinsic cultural or personality trait but as a situational one: part of a "social movement" that is defined as a radical search for change and for the type of personal leadership that might achieve that change. This is why Robert Tucker places such

³⁹Mark P. Sullivan, "Cuba After Fidel Castro: US Policy Implications and Approaches," *Congressional Research Service*, Library of Congress, September 1, 2006, p. 5. Emphasis added. It is interesting that Sullivan does not share this view.

⁴⁰Derek Bodde in Louis Gottschalf (ed.), *Generalization in the Writing of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 60.

⁴¹ Irvine Schifter, *Charisma: A Psychoanalytic Look at Mass Society* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973).

emphasis on the particular nature of social movements and concludes that “charismatic leadership is specifically salvationist or messianic in nature.”⁴²

Again, if this is the context in which such a leader emerges, are there identifiable traits that characterize a charismatic hero? Unfortunately, Weber, who always emphasized the transitory nature of charismatic authority, never really fully developed the individual dimensions of the phenomenon. This is where the work of fellow German sociologist Robert Michels is of enormous value. Attracted to Italy by the appeal of the “socialist” Benito Mussolini (Il Duce), Michels did a full study of charismatic leadership. “Michels’ attitude to Il Duce sounds very much like the comments in defense of Fidel Castro offered by some of his supporters.”⁴³ Michels describes charisma in terms of six specific characteristics, four of which are most relevant in the Cuban case as we try to discern differences between the brothers.⁴⁴

[1] The charismatic leader makes only sparing use of the bureaucracy or career functionaries, he chooses his collaborators according to their “charismatic qualifications,” and on the basis of “his inspiration.” This certainly holds true in the case of Fidel Castro. Writing in 1971, a very sympathetic US economist, Bertrand Silverman, noted that in Cuba the economy was being directed by “individuals without previous experience, technical know-how, or reliable information.” Even where there was a formal economic team in place, Castro made all final decisions through a parallel planning apparatus.⁴⁵ The first outsider to witness the operation of this parallel group of inner circle “experts” was Frei Betto. During a break in his long interview, Fidel Castro takes him into the *inner sanctum* and says: “I work directly with a team of 20 *compañeros*, 10 of whom are women. They form a coordination and support group. Each one tries to find out what’s going on in the country’s main production and service centers by maintaining contacts with them. Without clashing with the ministries, this team makes decision-making more dynamic. It is composed of people, not departments.... The problems can’t wait; they

⁴² Robert C. Tucker, “The Theory of Charismatic Leadership,” *Daedalus* (Summer, 1968), p. 743.

⁴³ Introduction to Robert Michel, *Political Parties* (New York, NY: Collier Books, 1962), p. vi.

⁴⁴ Robert Michels, *First Lectures in Political Sociology* Translated by Alfred De Grazia (New York, NY: Harper & Row [1949] 1965), pp. 119-133. These were part of his lectures at the University of Chicago in 1927.

⁴⁵ Bertrand Silverman, *Man and Society in Cuba* (City: Publisher, 1971), p. 22

must be solved immediately. We do the same thing with other decisive projects.”⁴⁶

Recent purges of much of Fidel’s circle of younger people might well mean that Raúl Castro is changing the decision-making *modus operandi*.

[2] Abdication is seen as an act of weakness. “The charismatic leader,” says Robert Michels, “does not abdicate, not even when water reaches his throat. Precisely in his readiness to die lies one element of his force and triumph.”⁴⁷ There is no reason to believe that there are any differences between the brothers on this score...while Fidel Castro is alive. It would be damaging for the younger brother to appear less ready to die than the still-living Fidel.

[3] Similarly, the charismatic leader is averse to some compromises that “its messianic logic” holds to be “vile and contemptible.”

It is Fidel who has consistently attacked what he has called “*economismo*,” “*burocratismo*,” “*los egoísmos y la corrupción*,” and “*los nuevos ricos*.” On November 17, 2005 Fidel gave a five hour speech condemning “*corrupción y el robo generalizado*.” The minor economic reforms of the mid-1980s and mid-1990s are believed to have been encouraged by Raúl and then withdrawn on Fidel’s insistence. The issue of economic policy is vital, as we shall note.

Having described the nature of charismatic leadership, Michels rejoins Weber in making a fundamental point: pure charismatic authority does not last long because any and all societies quite quickly see the need for rational organization, i.e., bureaucracy. “The sheer problem of administration,” says Seymour Martin Lipset, “necessitates bureaucracy.” Bureaucracy, with its rational (i.e., predictable) and hierarchically organized and goal-oriented structures, requires intermediaries who act initially on behalf of the leader. However, these “carriers of the faith” (as Michels called them) eventually develop positions and interests of their own and occupy their statuses and perform their roles on the basis of specific knowledge and skills. As this process develops, charisma is, as Weber put it, “routinized” or “depersonalized.”⁴⁸ Tucker explains this routinization further by explaining how it becomes institutionalized in a specific organization:

⁴⁶ Frei Betto, *Fidel and Religion* (New York: Ocean Press, 2006), p. 32.

⁴⁷ On the Cuban proclivity to suicide, see Louis A. Pérez, Jr., *To Die in Cuba* (University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

⁴⁸ Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, pp. 364-371.

In the process of depersonalization, charisma evolves into hereditary or ‘familial’ charisma with its locus in a royal family, for example, or into institutional charisma attached to an office like the priesthood.”⁴⁹

The idea of the routinization of charisma because of the need to organize and manage the society led Michels to state categorically, “Who says organization says oligarchy.” He then elaborated on his “iron law of oligarchy”: “By a universally applicable social law, every organ of the collectivity, brought into existence through the need for the division of labor, creates for itself, as soon as it becomes consolidated, interests peculiar to itself.”⁵⁰

In one of his still highly relevant studies, Harold Lasswell noted Weber’s emphasis on power and the relations of power, relations that would continue only so long as there was a continuing stream of “empowering responses”: “Even a casual inspection of human relations will convince any competent observer that power is not a brick that can be lugged from place to place, but a process that vanishes when the supporting responses cease.”⁵¹

If we establish the fact that the original “empowering responses” of Cuban society that made charismatic authority a reality some four decades ago vanished over time, then we can hypothesize that the most significant transition in Cuba has already occurred: from charismatic to legal-rational authority. The questions become: In which institution did that legal-rational authority first express itself, and what role did Raúl Castro play in that? The assumption has to be that plausible answers to these two questions will provide useful insights into Raúl Castro’s role in a future transition. The problem is that we have mighty few insights into Raúl’s character. His self-effacement, however, should give us the first inkling that things will be different.

During his many days traveling with Fidel Castro, Ché Guevara, and Raúl Castro in 1965, Lee Lockwood described the following scene: “... Raúl Castro has stepped out of the third helicopter, almost unnoticed among the group of other officials.... Raúl is not

⁴⁹“The Cult of the Departed Leader” in Tucker, “The Theory of Charismatic Leadership,” *Daedalus* (Summer, 1968), p. 753.

⁵⁰ Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (New York, NY: Collier Books, [1911] 1962).

⁵¹ Harold Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York: The Viking Press, 1962), p. 10.

at all like his brother, either in looks or personality, and he suffers a good deal from invidious comparisons with him.”⁵²

Lockwood follows this observation with the question: Could Raúl carry on the Revolution without Fidel? He answers his own question with a prescient observation (1965): “... often men show what they are capable of only when circumstances place a task before them.... Raúl, from the political point of view, possesses magnificent aptitudes.”⁵³

Lockwood did not mention it, but it was a fact that it was Raúl who was keeping the whole operation on track. Two French authors dedicate their 650 pages to analyzing the long delayed (but, in their minds, inevitable) fall of Fidel Castro. They pause long enough to ask the question, “¿*Qué es un Raúlista?*”⁵⁴ They answer with a refrain that has been around since the beginning of the Revolution: “*Los hombres de Raúl pueden resbalar pero no se caen.*” “*El concepto de Raúlista,*” they say, “*es útil, no por opuesto al de fidelista sino para señalar un hecho: Raúl Castro, a lo largo de su carrera, ha seleccionado, protegido, y a veces formado dirigentes que permanecen en los cargos, le son fieles y ha acabado por formar lo esencial del alto mando político.*”⁵⁵

Lacking his brother’s charisma but fully understanding the need for a disciplined and technically trained institution at a time when virtually all other mediating groups were being dismantled or exiled, Raúl Castro took the path so many others have taken in the Third World: building a modernizing military elite or oligarchy.⁵⁶ And let it be said that, if Alfred Vagts is correct in saying that “The acid test of an army is war ... and war only,”⁵⁷ then it has to be admitted that Raúl Castro and his military passed the test with flying colors, from the Bay of Pigs to Angola and a dozen other involvements. And, yet, in Cuba, in the shadow of Fidel Castro’s overwhelming appeal, the Cuban military has long been studied in terms of its many international involvements, seldom tooting its own

⁵² Lee Lockwood, *Castro’s Cuba, Cuba’s Fidel* (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), p. 11.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 169-170.

⁵⁴ Jean-François Fogel and Bertrand Rosenthál, *Fin de siglo en la Habana: Los secretos del derrumbe de Fidel* (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores, 1994), p. 264.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 264.

⁵⁶ On the role of new militaries in nation-building see, Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964) and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp.205-221.

⁵⁷ Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism, Civilian and Military* (London: Hollis & Carter, 1959).

horn at home. Again, not an unusual occurrence as Vagts tells us: "... armies are of all groups in society, the ones most subdued to historical memories in their methods and honor concepts: 'duty as our fathers understood it.'"⁵⁸

Be that as it may, it is widely recognized that the professional soldier has a need for recording history as a way of underpinning the collective and individual sense of honor of the institution. Military history and biography are major forgers of the corporate identity, loyalties, and perspectives of military leaders in all professional armies.⁵⁹

The observer should not be surprised, thus, that Raúl Castro, faced with the termination of military internationalism and the extraordinary difficulties that followed the cut-off of Soviet subsidies and military assistance, should have ordered the official recording of the many military victories. Aside from the fact that it reflects the explicit construction of a distinct strategic culture, this has to be interpreted as institutional history for contemporary purposes, i.e. for assuming a command role in the society. It began in 1996 with the military biographies of 41 generals and their combat experiences. Raúl Castro wrote the Preface with the following assertion: "*Fuimos capaces de hacer la historia pero no hemos sido capaces de escribirla.*" The 41 personal accounts reveal a top echelon that has been under Raúl Castro's command since the early days of the revolution. All, without exception, have had combat experience and, even without much formal education, appeared to have done very well in Soviet Bloc military institutions.⁶⁰

This publication was followed by another set of interviews in 1997, again authorized by Raúl Castro personally. The institutional and personal function of the publication becomes evident with the opening statement from Division General Nestor López Cuba: "The world needs to become better acquainted with Raúl's qualities as a leader, as a man, as a human being ... his simplicity...his concern for the individual, for his subordinates, for his family, for the people."⁶¹

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁵⁹ See Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 15-16.

⁶⁰ Raúl Castro, Prefacio in Luis Báez, *Secretos de Generales* (La Habana: Editorial Si-Mar, 1996).

⁶¹ *Making History: Interviews with Four Generals of Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces* (New York: Pathfinder, 1999).

Similarly, Division General Enrique Carreras notes that Raúl's place in the revolution "is hidden from many,"⁶² praises his organizational and leadership qualities while highlighting the fact that he is "extraordinarily affable ... a very Cuban personality." Another general calls him "*muy criollo*." Are these attempts to identify the military's strategic culture with the general political culture? A partial answer is to be had from the fact that the historians all repeat Raúl Castro's assertion that the Cuban army is a "political" army from which four things are expected, only one of which, interestingly enough, is a strictly military attribute:

[1] To act as political cadres with "high political, ideological and moral qualities."

[2] To be highly skilled military professionals.

[3] To all have "the basic skills of food production and agriculture."

[4] To have "a rudimentary knowledge of economic affairs."⁶³

These books are definite attempts to introduce Raúl Castro to the Cuban people and the world as a way of counteracting the reputation of "brutality." They were followed by another of similar tone. As if to emphasize his interest in the Chinese model, Raúl Castro took three Cuban generals of Chinese descent to China and then had them publish a book with Raúl and his ideas center-stage. These generals begin by describing how, at the beginning of 1995, they requested permission to establish a new system of compensation, one that went against the established egalitarian norms in Cuba, i.e., that those who work more should earn more.⁶⁴ They relate the following story:

To say it was OK for a worker to earn a thousand pesos a month was taboo. When Raúl came here in 1997 after a trip we had taken to China, he looked out at the organoponic garden from my office on the fourth floor. It is not a crime to earn a

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁶⁴ Armando Choy, Gustavo Chin, Moisés Sío Wong, *Our History is Still Being Written* (New York: Pathfinder, 2005), p. 130.

thousand pesos a month through honest hard work—that was his conclusion. And he said so publicly⁶⁵

Finally, one must, in an indirect way, include in this series Hal Klepak's *Cuba's Military, 1990-2005*, which carries the enigmatic but highly suggestive subtitle, "Revolutionary Soldiers during Counter-Revolutionary Times."⁶⁶ The exceptional access this Canadian military scholar had to so many military individuals and institutions could have come only from higher authority. That said, this does not detract from the objectivity of the book. It is, up to now, the best insider's view of the Cuban Armed Forces (FAC). The FAC, he says, will be "the key player in any transition." He develops this argument systematically and documents each of the following key points:

1. While Raúl Castro has none of the charisma of his brother, this should not be exaggerated. "Those closest to him ... are usually quite impressed by him...." [p. 52].
2. Raúl Castro established his credentials as a military commander and regional administrator as Commander of the Eastern Front. [p. 43].
3. He has been instrumental in forging the institutional links with the other key pillars of the society. [p. 44].
4. He has been the one most keenly interested in raising living standards through improving economic performance. [p. 57].
5. While open to discussions with the US on a range of issues, this will have to be done on as level a field of sovereign states as the enormous asymmetry allows.

It is widely accepted, thus, that the Cuban military has the professional and institutional resources and nationalist motivations to develop a modernizing strategic culture. Clearly, one of the fundamental characteristics that put the Cuban armed forces

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁶⁶ Hal Klepak, *Cuba's Military 1990-2005* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 63.

in such a position is organization, i.e., bureaucracy with “discipline, military order, chain of command, intolerance of absenteeism, and access to resources on a special basis.”⁶⁷

Klepak concludes with a broad assessment of the future role of the FAC:

They alone can hold the ring while that transition is sorted out and while popular expectations for rapid change (and improvement) are growing and even more demanding. They alone have the legitimacy to fulfill this potentially historic role in the eyes of the US military (with whom they could more easily deal than anyone else in the Cuban State apparatus)...⁶⁸

As does Klepak, Latell maintains that Raúl Castro is “the linchpin” of Fidel’s succession strategy and the “guarantor” of political stability in Cuba. “It is highly unlikely,” says Latell, “that Fidel could have held power so long without Raúl’s steady control of the armed forces.”⁶⁹ Given this analysis of the situation, it is not surprising that Latell believes that it will be Raúl who will have the opportunity and the capacity to set the revolution on a more rational and conciliatory course. This, he believes, might very well include some form of reconciliation with the US. Before he can do this, however, he has to establish his legitimacy beyond military circles; he has to establish himself as part of Cuba’s political culture in its present state.

The Political Culture of Contemporary Cuba

Because of the absolute control exercised by the state over all forms of communication, from the mass media to personal communications via the internet, the telephone, and the mail, unraveling the nature of popular political culture in Cuba is extremely difficult. We do have, however, four sources of empirical data that allow us to formulate two hypotheses.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 278.

⁶⁹ Latell, *After Fidel*, p. 21.

First, there is a 1994 poll, presented with appropriate *caveats*, which revealed that being a “communist” or even a “socialist” was a minority position in Cuba.⁷⁰ Note the self-descriptions:

¿Hablando de Ud. mismo, como se describe?

Revolucionario	-- 48%
No integrado	-- 24%
Comunista	-- 11%
Socialista	-- 10%

The poll understood *revolucionario* to imply nationalist, an appellation 88% would apply to themselves. But the dominant attitude was found to be apathy and/or inertia. The director of the poll, the Costa Rican Carlos Denton, concluded that “People go about their lives in every society without making transcendental decisions about themselves and their families ... and the Cubans are no exception.”

The second poll was the “Cuba Democracy and Governance Telephone Survey” of October 2007.⁷¹ In order of importance, these are the problems Cubans were most concerned with:

1. Transportation
2. Economic situation
3. US economic embargo
4. Housing situation

⁷⁰See the CID/Gallup poll done in November 1994 by the Costa Rican agency of Carlos Denton, *The Miami Herald*, December 12, 1994, pp. 1, 18, and 19. *Caveat*: It is rumored that Denton’s team was infiltrated by Cuban intelligence. Even so, the figures are revealing.

⁷¹NTS Consulting, funded by the Pan American Development Foundation project: “Public Opinion in Cuba at a Time of Transition.” “Cuba Democracy and Governance Telephone Survey (October 2007). *Caveat*: (1) done when Fidel Castro appeared to be deathly ill; (2) difficulty of doing survey research in Cuba [“information vacuum”]; (3) only 7.5% of Cuban households have fixed line telephones, and these are believed to be tapped by the state.

The pollsters concluded that Cuba was about to undergo substantial changes because of, (1) the high level of apathy—seven out of every 10 Cubans do **not** participate in CP meetings; (2) the high levels of **corruption/bribes**—twice as high as what they found in other Latin countries. Despite this, the pollsters found high level of positive attitudes (i.e. “trust” and “confidence”) toward the country’s institutions. The pollsters wonder whether this might not reflect high levels of apprehension and fear, since the poll was done over the phone, widely believed to be monitored by the authorities.

The third poll was carried out by Freedom House in 2008: “How Citizens View Their Country’s Future.”⁷² This survey found what in sociology are considered classical signs of alienation and appear to support the finding of the other polls:

*Cubans are very pessimistic about prospects for change.

*Cubans have no vision of a better future for their country.

*Concerns with food, money. Prices are uppermost: They are not thinking of freedom.”

*Dissidents/human rights groups remain “unknown or misunderstood.”

*No “sense of empowerment” among the ordinary people.

The fourth body of empirical evidence is a content analysis of the most available writings of 35 of Cuba’s most internationally recognized economists and social scientists.⁷³ Utilizing Antonio Gramsci’s concept of “organic intellectuals,” i.e., those who do plan and think about their nation’s future but are not part of the decision-making elite, the study found that (1) not a single one of the 35 used Marxist methodology to frame their analysis, and (2) not a single reference to Marx, Engels, or Ché Guevara was found and only two references to speeches by Fidel Castro.

⁷²Freedom House [Telephone] Survey – 2008: “How Citizens View Their Country’s Future.” March, 2009 Freedom House report based on its interviews with 160 Cubans throughout Cuba (September – October, 2008). cubareports@fhlists.org *Caveat*: Survey done right after two hurricanes devastated two provinces of the island.

⁷³See Anthony P. Maingot, “Epistemic Organic Intellectuals and Cuba’s ‘Battle of Ideas,’” Paper presented at City University of New York, March 14, 2008. Available at <http://cubainfo.fiu.edu/CubaContext/Maingot2.html>

Carmelo Mesa Lago and Jorge Pérez-López, in a very comprehensive study of many of these scholars,⁷⁴ note that every one of them was a loyal adherent of the revolutionary regime, evident by their rejection of neo-liberalism and support of the socialist system. However, while there were differences among them in interpretation and emphasis, “their identification of current problems is markedly similar.”⁷⁵ Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López analyze 17 areas of substantial agreement. We chose to highlight six of the problems the Cuban economists cite as explanations as to why Cuba still confronts a “failed” or stalled recovery:

- [1] Cuba has been unable to generate sufficient internal resources to invest for a sustained recovery.
- [2] Cuba’s international credit-worthiness is poor; there is limited access to external credits and loans.
- [3] It is “impossible” to restrict consumption further to divert resources to investment as consumption is already depressed.
- [4] The only way out is to increase domestic efficiency and enterprise competitiveness.
- [5] The enterprise management reform process (*perfeccionamiento empresarial*) is new and very slow in implementation; “verticalism” and enterprise centralization and concentration continued its deleterious effects.
- [6] Finally, and critically, there were the political, social structural impacts: a decline in real wages, increase in disguised unemployment, steeper income stratification, and concentration of bank deposits by, and prebends for, the elite. In addition, the sociologists make a strong point about worrying demographic trends: declining population because of low fertility and out-migration and the dramatic aging of the population.

⁷⁴Carmelo Mesa Lago and Jorge Pérez-López, *Cuba’s Aborted Reform* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005).

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

Neither of these is mitigated, as in other countries, by immigration. People simply do not migrate to Cuba in significant numbers.⁷⁶

Not surprisingly, all the Cuban economists recommend changing property relations, decentralizing economic decision-making and promoting domestic competition, none of which coincides with Fidel Castro's ideas. There is a disconnection, thus, between the existing strategic culture established and defended by Fidel Castro and that of the intellectuals. Established sociological theory advises us that this is dangerous for the *status quo*.

In analyzing the data that reflects a high degree of alienation and/or disaffection among the young and a clear disconnect with the organic intellectuals, it is important to revisit Richard Fagen's *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba* (1969) and the documentary film "Compañeros y Compañeras".⁷⁷ It was among the young, said Fagen, that the enthusiasm for the revolutionary changes was highest. He cites three main arguments, one theoretical and the other empirical.

[1] His theory is based on Erik Erickson's work on *Identity, Youth and Crisis* (1968). Youth, said Erikson, are most easily indoctrinated if they are enthusiastic about a program.

[2] In the early stages, said Fagen, young people felt empowered by a series of involvements—rural education, internationalism.

[3] The fact that the charismatic leader and the leadership all were very young and dressed the same way as the young people solidified the bonding.

Fifty years later, Cuba is quite a different place. First, the elite are a veritable gerontocracy: Fidel is 83, Raúl is 78, and José R. Machado Ventura, first in line of succession, is 79; the youngest member of Raúl's circle is 68. Secondly, this elite governs

⁷⁶ See, Sergio Diaz-Briquets, "Cuba: Demographic and Generational Challenges," paper prepared for the Cuba Workshop.

⁷⁷ Richard Fagen, *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969). *Compañeros y Compañeras* is a 1969 documentary about the "self-criticism" sessions, which were, in fact, harsh indoctrination classes. It is in the Antilles Research Collection, Sterling Library, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.

through a stultifying, centralized bureaucracy that engenders no enthusiasm among the young (as the surveys demonstrate). Purges and repeated postponements of the long-overdue Congress of the Communist Party do nothing to enhance the image of the regime. Such is the state of the political culture of contemporary Cuba.

Conclusion

There is an evident gap between the **strategic culture** of an aging elite still very much defensive and pursuing a geopolitical zero-sum game with the US and the **political culture** of the people and the intellectuals, who are asking for reforms and, to put it bluntly, food on the table (in Cuba, “*jama*”).

What contemporary Cuba illustrates is what sociologists of revolutions have long known: creating a **new political culture** is an extremely complex undertaking. After fifty years—two full generations—of forceful attempts at constructing new statuses, values, and mores, i.e., a “New Man”—there is little evidence that this has been achieved. Indeed, in those areas where the regime, and Fidel Castro himself, have made mighty efforts to create new attitudes toward corruption and intellectual “deviationism,” they appear to have lost the battle as Jorge Pérez-López notes.⁷⁸

Socio-political processes appear to be heading in the exact opposite direction from the early phases of the revolution. As we already noted, in the early stages there existed what Irvine Schifter calls “a rescue-hungry people,” who sought a leadership that was, in Robert Tucker’s terms, “salvationist” or “messianic” in nature. And that “messiah” initially had much expropriated property and wealth to redistribute. No such wealth is available today, hence the symbiotic leader. Mass interaction has changed dramatically, at least among the young and intellectuals. There is no longer any expectation of “salvation” from the leadership, and the sentiment of inherent trust has for all practical purposes evanesced.

⁷⁸ Jorge Pérez-López, “Corruption in Cuba: Challenges, Continuity and Change” Strategic Culture Workshop. See further by Perez-Lopez and Sergio Diaz-Briquets, *Corruption in Cuba: Castro and Beyond* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006).

This situation presents US policy with a clear dilemma: should it put all its efforts into attempting to influence the **political culture** of the masses (viz. radio, TV Martí, funds for dissidents), or should it attempt to reduce the sense of threat ingrained in the elite's **strategic culture**?

Two considerations should precede any discussion of these two options:

[1] As Brian Latell argues with such clarity, the Cuban elite, including the military show no signs of disaffection with the State, and Raúl Castro specifically, putting them into more and more political and economic positions, their corporate self-interest appears assuaged.

[2] Changes in the identification with the elite should not be confused with changes in the identity of the Cuban people. Again, since we have so often in the past forgotten this, we need empirical references to make this point crystal clear. An excellent case is the response of the “dissidents”—clearly disaffected from the regime—to the Bush Administration’s tightening of the screws and the embargo. Here are some of the reactions of prominent dissidents to the Bush Commission Report as reported by the international press and cited by Pablo Alfonso of El Nuevo Herald (July 12, 2006):

-**Martha Beatrice Roque**: “The assistance would be helpful because Cuba is destroyed...but the question of change is a matter for Cubans to decide....”

-**Oscar Espinoza Chepe**: “I am grateful for the solidarity of the government and the people of the United States; nevertheless, I believe this report is counterproductive...we want solidarity but no interference....”

-**Elizardo Sanchez**: “This is another example of the expressions and initiatives of Washington regarding Cuba, which have a counterproductive effect...”

Manuel Cuesta Morua: “These are 80 million arguments for the Cuban

government to make us all seem financed by the U.S....

-Vladimiro Roca: “Let them send the money but without strings attached...”

-Laura Pollan: No problem receiving assistance but this “has to be resolved by Cubans....We will never accept any imposition because we want Cubans to make a democratic and sovereign solution.”

-Miriam Leyva: “The US should not get involved in the solution of the internal problems of Cuba....” Leyva, wife of Oscar Espinosa Chepe and founder of the “Damas de Blanco” movement, sent *El Nuevo Herald* (July 15, 2006) a long article calling the unveiling of the Bush Report “Fidel Castro’s Best Birthday Present” and railing against the ignoring of the “conditions of the moment in Cuba” and how Cubans feel about them.

Is it any surprise that the most visible dissident in Cuba, Oswaldo Paya of the Movimiento Cristiano Liberación, when promoting the Proyecto Varela, invariably prefaces each presentation of the National Dialogue with the words, “The editing of this document was done by Cubans completely within Cuba.” (See his column, *Miami Herald*, 7-5-06). Or, take the position of one whose courage and heroism fighting for the revolution was equaled by his heroism opposing what he considered the deviation of original goals, the late Gustavo Arcos Bergnes: “In Cuba,” he tells Andrés Oppenheimer, “we do not want bloodshed. If there are sectors who hope there will be a violent *coup d’etat*, or a civil war, or a social uprising that will be crushed with force, let me tell you, the majority of Cubans do not want it.” They want rather, an internal political settlement which would bring about peaceful change. Oppenheimer feels compelled to note that listening to the likes of Gustavo Arcos, you realize that the Miami exile leaders “are out of touch with the island’s political realities.”⁷⁹

⁷⁹Andrés Oppenheimer, *Castro’s Final Hour* (N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 336.

Who, then, would Washington be speaking to, if it attempted to modify the “character” and “spirit” of today’s Cubans from the outside? Certainly not the Roman Catholic Church so often mentioned to be in the opposition. Listen to Cardinal Jaime Ortega, Archbishop of Havana: “...*la Iglesia Católica cubana jamás estaría...ni siquiera aceptando mínimamente cualquier intervención extranjera. ¡Jamás!*”⁸⁰. Keep in mind that as a cardinal, Ortega speaks with the approval of the Vatican.

The conservative wisdom of Edmund Burke’s advice that “...if in all the operations, and effects of Government ... no man can extend them agreeable to our forms, and, modes, you must change your modes,” seems applicable when attempting to identify the changes taking place in the strategic culture of Cuba. In the final analysis, as John Lewis Gaddis notes, “The old dilemma of how to encourage change from outside without provoking nationalism from within remained as real [today] as it had been in Wilson’s day.”⁸¹ Self-determination is what freedom is all about.⁸²

One could not do much better than to pay heed to the recommendation of a veteran of US-Cuban and Latin American relations, General Barry R. McCaffrey.⁸³ He notes correctly that the Cuban state has lost legitimacy domestically. “The Cuban state has been unable to meet the aspirations of the Cuban people.” His conclusions are on target:

[1] The people of Cuba need to determine their own future.

[2] US role should be “supportive.” “We should start now by rapidly lifting the embargo. This will be a catalyst for political change.”

[3] Military-to-military relations between the US and Cuba “can play a positive role.”

⁸⁰ Cited in El Nuevo Herald, August 7, 2006, p. B-2.

⁸¹ John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War* (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 44.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 201.

⁸³ Statement to Hearing on “National Security Implications of US Policy Toward Cuba,” Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, April 29, 2009.

But a Cuba governed by Raúl Castro will also face a difficult dilemma. As it depends more critically on the 100,000 barrels a day of Venezuelan oil (for which some 30,000 Cuban doctors, teachers, and security personnel have to work), Raúl Castro will have to decide whether it stands by President Hugo Chávez's increasingly strident radicalism and anti-Americanism or open to the US, the only nation that will bring tourists, remittances, a marketing and refining capacity for its oil and, critically, access to the capital and know-how of the Cuban diaspora. Raúl Castro's long experience dealing with the USSR in military matters must help him understand the implications of Chávez's multi-billion dollar purchases of Russian arms.⁸⁴ Many of the studies of Cuban intellectuals mentioned in Section VII argue that Cuba's prospects lie in an opening to the world of capital and technology and this *ipso facto* means dealing with the US. As Jorge Espinosa notes,⁸⁵ Cuba is not yet prepared to enter into the global market for services, a path they have made much to-do about.

Raúl Castro is surely aware that while the Nixon-Kissinger policy of "linkage" in foreign affairs might not have the same ideological and strategic importance it had during the Cold War, it is still relevant to "Great Power" jousting competitions. Does Cuba want to be dragged into a Chávez-led, Russian-armed ALBA, which, seeing their economies and popularity falter, are ratcheting-up the tension by speaking of "winds of war," citing the US military presence in Colombia—that is, US bases and the "Fourth Fleet"? Much will depend on whether what Robert Michel says about the charismatic leader's unwillingness to change directions "even when water reaches his throat" remains the dominant strategic culture of the new elite under Raúl Castro.

⁸⁴ On Chávez's foreign policy, see Ralph S. Clem and Anthony P. Maingot (ed.), *Venezuela's Foreign Policy: The Role of Petro-Diplomacy* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, forthcoming.)

⁸⁵ "Intellectual Property and Technology Deals in Cuba," Cuba Strategic Culture Workshop.

APPENDIX “A”:

Watersheds in Cuban Economics Thought as Reflected in the Writings of Their Organic Intellectuals

A. Colonial Period to 1900

1820s + the “*Generación del '20*”

Felix Varela, José Antonio Saco: favor economic-trading liberalism Fear of Haitianization a major part of their opposition to slavery.

1890s + José Martí: much influenced by American industry. In Mexico in 1875 he wrote: “vive un pueblo de lo que elabora y de lo que extrae El gobierno guía, encamina; pero ni crea hombres, ni despierta soñolientas aptitudes Para que el comercio, pues, sea fructífero ... hemos de tener productos que exportar...”

B. Early National Period 1902 – 1934

Three Schools

[1] Classical: large large scale production geared to assured markets.

[2] Nationalist – Reformist: (Manuel Sanguily, Ramiro Sánchez Guerra, *Azucar y Población en las Antillas* [1927]); Fernando Ortiz, *Contrapunto cubano, tabaco y azucar*.

Small Farmers (*colonos*) – Better for development than plantations.

[3] Marxists against capitalist development: influenced by the Soviet Revolution: Julio Antonio Mella, Rubén Martínez Villena.

C. The Constitution of 1940

Was a pluralist gathering of every political-ideological constituency on the island. Recommended a state-directed essentially European-style social democracy. This was part of Fidel Castro's early program.

D. Post World War II – 1950s

Dominant School: Latin American Structuralist School:

Central Planning

Domestic Savings for Investment

Foreign Investment

Diversification of Markets

Autochthonous State Institutions – Central Bank, Agricultural
Credit Bank

(Felipe Pazos, Regino Boti; Julian Alienes Urosa, *Tesis sobre el desarrollo economico en Cuba* (1951).

Influence on Fidel Castro's **Five Laws** (see his *La historia me absolverá* (1953), Jorge Manach.

[1] Restore Constitution of 1940.

[2] Land (in perpetuity and non-transferable) to the “*colonos, subcolonos, arrendatarios, aparceros y precaristas*” who till 5 or fewer *caballerias*.

[3] Freedom of labor mobility and employment.

[4] *Colonos* to produce 55% of cane.

[5] Confiscation of all properties belonging to corrupt government officials.

E. Revolution – 1959 on

[1] Ché Guevara: concern with “*subdesarrollo*.”

Total opposition to “capitalist” development;

Need to create **New Man** through “moral incentives.”

(Che's "Great debate" opposing sticking to Marxist theory of "stages" of development against classical socialists, René Dumont (French), Charles Bettelheim (Belgian), J. S. Karol (Hungarian). Che's ideas adopted by Fidel Castro

[2] Total dependence on Soviet Socialist Bloc (COMECON)

During mid-1980s: modest opening of farmers' markets. Closed down by Castro as sponsoring capitalism.

[3] 1989/1991 – "Special Period" of hardships. Castro refuses to modify system.

F. Contemporary Situation

- a] Venezuela: A new dependence
- b] Inadequate production: How to stimulate?
- c] How to reintegrate into global economy?
- d] **Intellectuals debate need for economic reform**

About the Author

Dr. Anthony P. Maingot is currently Professor Emeritus of Sociology and Anthropology at Florida International University. Dr. Maingot, a native of Trinidad, received his Ph.D. from the University of Florida in 1967, and has taught at Yale University (1966-72), the University of the West Indies, Trinidad (1972-74) and, since 1974, at FIU. He was a member of the Constitutional Reform Commission of Trinidad, 1971-1974. Dr. Maingot is coauthor of *A Short History of the West Indies*, now in its fourth edition; and author of: *Small Country Development and International Labor Flows: Experiences in the Caribbean; the United States*.

**FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
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Dr. John Proni
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Dr. Norman Munroe
ARC Director of Research

Jerry F. Miller, Colonel, USAF (Ret.)
ARC Associate Director

STRATEGIC CULTURE STUDY FACILITATORS

Brian Fonseca (brian.fonseca@fiu.edu)
Dr. Marvin Astrada (marvin.astrada@fiu.edu)
Moisés Caballero (moises.caballero@fiu.edu)

GRADUATE & UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH ASSISTANTS

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