

Dominican Strategic Culture

by Eduardo Gamarra
December 2010



14

FINDINGS REPORT

FIU

Applied Research Center

Latin American and Caribbean Center

Florida International University



Applied Research
Center

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

The FIU-SOUTHCOM Academic Partnership Strategic Cultures Assessments

Florida International University's Applied Research Center (FIU ARC), in collaboration with the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and FIU's Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC), has recently formed the FIU-SOUTHCOM Academic Partnership. The partnership entails FIU providing the highest quality research-based knowledge to further explicative understanding of the political, strategic, and cultural dimensions of state behavior and foreign policy. This goal will be accomplished by employing a strategic culture approach. The initial phase of strategic culture assessments consists of a year-long research program that focuses on developing a standard analytical framework to identify and assess the strategic culture of ten Latin American countries. FIU will facilitate professional presentations of the following ten countries over the course of one year: Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina. In addition, a findings report on the impact of Islam and Muslims within Latin America will be produced.

The overarching purpose of the project is two-fold: to generate a rich and dynamic base of knowledge pertaining to the political, social, and strategic factors that influence state behavior; and to contribute to SOUTHCOM's Socio-Cultural Dynamics (SCD) Program. Utilizing the notion of strategic culture, SOUTHCOM has commissioned FIU ARC to conduct country studies in order to explain how states comprehend, interpret, and implement national security policy vis-à-vis the international system.

SOUTHCOM defines strategic culture as follows: "the combination of internal and external influences and experiences – geographic, historical, cultural, economic, political and military – that shape and influence the way a country understands its relationship to the rest of the world, and how a state will behave in the international community." FIU will identify and expound upon the strategic and cultural factors that inform the rationale behind the perceptions and behavior of select states in the present political and security climate by analyzing demography, history, regional customs, traditions, belief systems, and other cultural and historical influences that have contributed to the development of a particular country's current security rationale and interpretation of national security.

To meet the stated goals, FIU ARC will host a series of professional workshops in Miami. These workshops bring subject matter experts from all over the US and Latin America together to explore and discuss a country's specific history, geography, culture, economic, political, and military climates vis-à-vis strategic culture. At the conclusion of each workshop, FIU publishes a findings report, which is presented at SOUTHCOM.

The following Dominican Republic Findings Report, authored by Dr. Eduardo Gamarra, is the product of a working group held in Miami on August 19, 2010, which included six prominent academic and private sector experts in Dominican history, culture, geography, economics, politics, and military affairs.

The views expressed in this findings report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US Government, US Department of Defense, US Southern Command, FIU-ARC, or Florida International University.

On behalf of FIU-ARC, we wish to acknowledge and thank all of the participants for their contributions, which made the Dominican Strategic Culture workshop a tremendous success.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	4
Introduction	8
The Origins of Dominican Strategic Culture	8
<i>History and Geopolitics</i>	8
<i>Haitian Paradoxes</i>	9
<i>US Proximity and Influence</i>	14
<i>Geography and Geology: Hispaniola and the Caribbean</i>	18
<i>Porous Air, Land, and Sea borders</i>	19
<i>Weak State and Institutions</i>	20
Keepers of Dominican Strategic Culture	24
<i>The Business Elite</i>	26
<i>The Armed Forces and National Police</i>	27
The Future of Strategic Culture in the Dominican Republic	29
Selected Bibliography	31
About the Author	32



Executive Summary

- The Dominican State is relatively strong. It has a modicum of control over the border and is able to implement public policy throughout its national territory.
- The democratic political regime in the Dominican Republic retains the clientelistic nature of the system from the earlier authoritarian era. In some measure, all authority rests with the chief executive partially because of the presidential nature of the system. This is a structural characteristic that is also paradoxically responsible for the relative success of the system. It binds citizens, the private sector, political parties and all other institutions. It also contributes to the charges of widespread corruption and the subsequent erosion of support for democracy and the political institutions that run the system.
- Many authors have noted the overwhelming importance of caudillos. Less than a dozen individuals have been the protagonists of this feature. The twentieth century can be reduced perhaps to the importance of Trujillo, Balaguer, Bosch, and most recently Fernandez. In all cases, except Bosch, these individuals not only governed the country for several years, they were also perceived as indispensable for the country's future. And, for better or worse, these individuals are undoubtedly the most important modernizing figures of the country.

Geographic and Historical Influences

- The Dominican Republic's location in the Caribbean, its proximity to the United States, and its porous borders make it highly susceptible to contrabands of all types, especially human and drug trafficking.
- Another important geographical consideration in Dominican Strategic Culture is the recurrent vulnerability to climate and natural disasters. Over the course of the past 100 years, literally dozens of hurricanes have profoundly impacted the country.
- Dominican Strategic Culture has been largely influenced by the events that surrounded its formative post-independence period. It was invaded by Haiti in 1822 and fought against the occupation until its liberation in 1844. However, liberation did not provide the Dominican

nation any respite; it fought off subsequent Haitian attempts to reconquer it for another 12 years. Dominican leaders continued to emphasize the threat of a Haitian reoccupation as a way to construct a sense of national oneness.

- The formation of the state and political system was largely conditioned by an attempt to differentiate the Dominican Republic in every way possible from Haiti. The very notion of a Haitian threat served both to distinguish Dominicans ethnically and to determine the nature of institutional development, especially the role and mission of the armed forces.
- The US interventions conditioned the pattern of political development of the Dominican Republic in a variety of ways and in each case intervention was justified as a way to protect the country from a larger threat to its national security – political instability. The changing nature of US influence is rooted in both the democratization experience that got under way in 1978 and in the remarkable growth of Dominican immigration to the United States.
- The security sector as a whole has undergone a very slow process of reform since 1978. The military retains an enormous amount of autonomy from civilian sectors especially in terms of its budget and overall management. Civilians not only lack the expertise on security and defense issues; they also play no role in the overall supervision of the institution.

Keepers of Strategic Culture

- The most important keeper of Dominican Strategic Culture is a relatively stable three party system. The principal reason explaining the overwhelming importance of the party system has to do with the profoundly clientelistic nature of Dominican politics. Political parties are perceived less as bearers of programmatic and or ideological content and more as providers of posts, jobs, and contracts for loyal followers.
- The business elite in the Dominican Republic are also important keepers of Strategic Culture. This group has been a small sector historically and it has invariably been linked to politics. It is not surprising then to see just a few families closely tied to governments and also the

beneficiaries of contracts, land grants, and favorable policies. For the Dominican business community, political continuity has been important.

- The armed forces and police are specifically vested in the continuity of the system and are resistant to any fundamental change that would affect their prerogatives and privileges. At the same time, the large number of prerogatives contributes to their support for civilian leadership and thus they are unlikely to ever contemplate a more direct role in the political system.
- Unlike the armed forces of other Latin American countries, Dominican soldiers have played only a secondary role in the politics of the Dominican Republic. Nonetheless, they are an important keeper of its Strategic Culture. The armed forces are extremely politicized. Promotions are less grounded in merit and more with the specific political ties within prominent political sectors.
- The National Police has been even more reticent to change than the armed forces. Its resistance to change is rooted in some measure in its military training and formation that in a way makes it not a civilian institution but another branch of the armed forces.

Enduring Rivalries and Emerging Challenges

- The Haitian threat is something that has been passed down generation after generation and is even on the minds of a few contemporary Dominicans who believe today that a silent invasion is occurring as thousands of poor Haitians flock to the country each day in search of better living conditions.
- As has been recurrent among every nation afflicted by drug trafficking, corruption has been a major problem in the armed forces. Major purges have occurred in the Dominican armed forces and dozens of members have been kicked out of the institution. The problem, however, is still very large and is unlikely to disappear overnight.

- In the long term, the Haitian presence in the Dominican Republic will have an impact on Strategic Culture. It is clear however, that if the international community does not play a more active role in addressing Haiti's problems, these will become major challenges to Dominican Strategic Culture and in the long term could lead to increasing border tensions and a massive resurgence of nationalism and xenophobia.

Change and Continuity in Dominican Strategic Culture

- Dominican Strategic Culture is unlikely to change significantly because its keepers are enormous beneficiaries. More important, the benefits of the system have led to high rates of economic growth that serve mainly to support the status quo.
- The most serious challenge continues to be, as it has been from the beginning, addressing the multiple Haitian issues that affect the country. However, the fact remains that Haiti is the Dominican Republic's second most important trading partner and its most important export market. Over half a billion dollars in trade cross the border each year.
- Given the absence of the Haitian government along the border, Dominican institutions have performed many duties for both sides including customs, migration, and law enforcement. In short, the paradox is that controlling the ebb and flow of Haitian migrants has contributed to the construction of stronger state institutions.
- Microtrafficking and major narco-trafficking accounts for a large portion of violent crime and criminality throughout the country but especially in the largest urban centers. Like elsewhere, it also accounts for increasing corruption within the armed forces, the police, and every institution that comes in touch with the industry.
- Institutional weakness is perhaps tied more directly to political culture. Dominican institutions are susceptible to the influence and role played by individuals. Thus, when a specific cabinet member changes, the entire ministry can also undergo a major shift in personnel as well as its policies. This logic is tied closely with the historical prevalence of national and political party caudillos that still dominate political life.

Introduction

This paper presents an analysis of Strategic Culture in the Dominican Republic based on a series of papers commissioned by the Applied Research Center at Florida International University. It is divided into three broad sections following the Strategic Culture framework. Section one examines the historical, structural and cultural factors that contributed to the development of Dominican Strategic Culture. Section two provides an analysis of the forces, actors, and factors responsible for maintaining this culture. In the final section, an attempt is made to explain the long term prospects of the Dominican Republic's Strategic Culture, with a particular focus on how it has paradoxically contributed to a minimization of political and international conflict.

The Origins of Dominican Strategic Culture

The origins of Dominican Strategic Culture include historical, geographical and cultural factors. These factors are mutually reinforcing and have long shaped the way in which contemporary Dominicans perceive the world. At the same time, these factors have also shaped the way in which the world sees the Dominican Republic. Dominican Strategic Culture partially explains the pattern of tense relations that have prevailed historically with Haiti, its only physical neighbor. It also provides a good framework to understand the prevalent pattern of political development.

History and Geopolitics

The formation of the Dominican State was always threatened by foreign intervention. Paradoxically, as Pope Atkins noted “a recurrent theme in the Dominican foreign intervention was the effort to exchange sovereignty for security under a foreign protector.”¹ Between 1844 and 1859, weak Dominican governments, facing several attempts by Haiti to retake the entire island, sought protection from France, Spain, and the United States. In 1861 Spain agreed to perform that role and did so for four turbulent years in a close but unstable relationship with General Santana, one of the great military caudillos of the period. By 1865 the relationship with

¹ G. Pope Atkins and Larman C. Wilson, *The Dominican Republic and the United States: from Imperialism to Transnationalism* (University of Georgia Press, 1998) p. 15.

Spain had collapsed and following several bloody battles, the Dominicans were again independent.

The Haitian occupation and the subsequent Spanish intervention were a prelude to at least two other interventions by foreign forces. The most noteworthy are the US invasion and occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1916-1929 and the US invasion of 1965. In both cases, US intervention conditioned the pattern of political development of the Dominican Republic in a variety of ways and in each case intervention was justified as a way to protect the country from a larger threat to its national security.

Haitian Paradoxes

The Dominican Republic possesses a unique story of its independence. Unlike most other Latin American nations who celebrate their freedom from a European colonial power, every 27 February Dominicans celebrate their independence from Haiti in 1844. This single historical fact has had a profound impact on the development of Strategic Culture in the Dominican Republic. For twenty two years (1822-1844) Haiti governed both sides of Hispaniola leaving a lasting impact on the polity, society, economy, and culture of the new emerging nation.² It took a 12-year war, lasting until 1856 to defeat repeated attempts by Haiti to unify the island of Hispaniola.

The formation of the state and political system was largely conditioned by an attempt to differentiate the Dominican Republic in every possible way from Haiti. From the outset this involved developing a State whose principal mission was to protect the new country from Haitian attempts to reunite the island, as mandated by the Haitian constitution. Constructing a new state in the aftermath of Haitian rule was extraordinarily difficult mainly because of recurrent invasion attempts by Haiti and the pattern of internal conflict characterized by coups and political turmoil between competing factions and leaders. The first attempt failed as the Dominican Republic experienced a short lived period of Spanish control in the early 1860s. Thus, the Dominican Republic underwent a second war of independence in 1866, which Dominicans proudly celebrate each 16 August as Restoration Day (*Día de la Restauración*).³

² Elsewhere I have analyzed the impact that losing the Dominican side of Hispaniola had on the formation of Haiti. See, Eduardo A. Gamarra and Brian Fonseca, *Strategic Culture in Haiti...*

³ Frank Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic: A National History*, (Hispaniola Books, 1995) is the best available English language history of the Dominican Republic. Other important and useful interpretations can be found in Julio Cross Beras, Doctoral Dissertation Cornell University, and Flavio Dario Espinal, Doctoral Dissertation University of Virginia.

While independence from Haiti came before the Restoration from Spain and well in advance of recurrent US interventions, relations with this neighbor have always been problematic and changing. Several factors explain this particularly conflictive pattern of bilateral relations. First, Haiti's nation and state building problems were exacerbated by the loss of the Dominican side of Hispaniola, in addition to the onerous independence debt it owed to France. This made it even more pressing for Haiti to seek reunification, despite the fact that by the mid 1800s it lacked the capacity to do so. Nonetheless, Dominican leaders continued to emphasize the threat of a Haitian reoccupation as a way to construct a sense of national oneness. The Haitian threat is something that has been passed down generation after generation and is even on the minds of a few contemporary Dominicans who believe today that a silent invasion is occurring as thousands of poor Haitians flock to the country each day in search of better living conditions. At the same time, the very notion of a Haitian threat served both to distinguish Dominicans ethnically and to determine the nature of institutional development, especially the role and mission of the armed forces.

As Lilian Bobea argues,

“Dominican ethnicity was defined by distinguishing itself from the invading culture and that also determined its subsequent relationship with the neighboring country both in terms of the popular imagery as well strategically since the implicit role played by the Armed Forces was initially defined at the border, a place conceived as a military strategic setting and therefore a threat. The mission of the armed forces has always been to protect the country from a potential Haitian military and social demographic invasion.”⁴

A second factor has to do with the fact that the Dominican side of the island, despite political turmoil, developed a national economy by creating a viable export market. This reality made the Dominican side wealthier and by the early twentieth century a magnet for Haitian labor which was required for the booming agricultural sector, especially the production of sugar by both foreign and Dominican companies. This significant difference in economic well being widened with each passing decade. Today, the Dominican economy experiences regular periods of economic growth while Haiti lapses each day into further chaos. Thus, Dominican growth and

⁴ Lilian Bobea, *Cultura Estratégica de Republica Dominicana*.

Haitian chaos combine to exacerbate the demand for cheap labor that now characterizes other facets of the economy including agriculture, agro industry, hotels, tourism, and construction. Of similar importance is the fact that Haiti is the Dominican Republic's second most important trading partner and its most important export market. Over half a billion dollars in trade cross the border each year.

A third factor involves a paradoxical relationship with Haiti. The formation and health of the economy in the Dominican Republic has been heavily influenced by Haiti. Largely undocumented Haitian workers—primarily agricultural but increasingly in other sectors of the economy—have contributed enormously to the pattern of growth and development of the Dominican Republic. This is of course, the same pattern that can be observed elsewhere in the world including Latin American undocumented workers in the United States and Spain, Bolivians in Argentina, Nicaraguans in Costa Rica, and dozens of other examples. The paradox is that undocumented workers contribute enormously to the host nation yet ways are found to exclude them from the benefits of possessing a legal status. This factor continues to create tension between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. As Hoberman notes, the possibility of undocumented workers ever achieving a legal status is limited by the very constitution.

A similar degree of Haitian influence can be found in the formation of the Dominican State itself. The perverse nature of this influence is particularly evident during the three decades of the Trujillo period when the dictator did his utmost to inoculate the country from a direct Haitian presence. This involved pursuing policies such as the infamous 1937 Massacre to paradoxically welcoming Jewish refugees fleeing the European Holocaust. The other paradox of the Trujillo period (1929-1960) was that it involved a major period of institutional development under the Generalissimo's iron hand. The national reach of state institutions was achieved during this period, specifically achieving a relatively significant control over the national border with Haiti. Unlike the situation in other Latin American countries, Trujillo controlled the entire national territory and was able to implement policy. In some measure, the basis for the relative contemporary strength of the Dominican State was established under Trujillo.

As Hoberman notes:

“Trujillo's ideology was built on three main foundations: the exultation of the Hispanic legacy, Catholicism as a core value of Dominican society, and the Spanish language. The disdain with which Trujillo's ideology treated the Haitian neighbor, particularly

following the Haitian massacre in 1937, was rooted in the underestimation of the Afro-French culture. Specifically, Trujillo's national security policy was deeply ingrained in an always reinforced zero-sum game against Haiti, whereby the latter implied a continuous threat to the national interests of the Dominican nation."⁵

While the border with Haiti is very porous –a fact that adds to fears of a peaceful invasion by Haitians searching for jobs and fleeing uncertainty at home—it is also true that since Trujillo, successive governments have obsessed about improving the presence of State institutions. The most recent effort is the creation and establishment of CESFRONT, a three thousand strong command aimed at controlling the flow of Haitian migrants into the Dominican Republic. Given the absence of the Haitian government along the border, Dominican institutions have performed many duties for both sides including customs, migration, and law enforcement. In short, the paradox is that controlling the ebb and flow of Haitian migrants has contributed to the construction of stronger state institutions.

Finally, it is also very clear that the permanent contact between Haitians and Dominicans has led to the adoption of cultural norms that are now unrecognizable as solely Haitian or Dominican. At the same, time, however, Dominicans have historically stressed the differences with Haiti and Haitians. Dominicans emphasize color, culture, and history as differentiating factors. In several qualitative data gathering exercises conducted by the author over the past few years, Dominicans point to personal habits (Dominicans “bathe several times every day while Haitians don’t” and remarks about the darkness of Haitian skin). The reality is, however, that Haitian cultural influence ranges from cuisine, art, music, religion and dance.

Despite the factors that have historically contributed to sharpening the cleavage between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, since the mid 1990s and largely at the instigation of the Dominican government, some significant and positive change has begun to occur in Haitian Dominican relations. The first attempt was the 1996 establishment of a high level Binational Commission that included government officials and members of the private sector and civil society. This Commission met rarely over the course of 14 years it has been in place and when meetings occurred they were often driven by an over ambitious agenda and were largely unproductive. It became clear that on its own and without significant interest from the

⁵ Gabriela Hoberman, Race and National Security Policy in the Dominican Republic.

governments of both countries, the Binational Commission would never become the instrument for the transformation of bilateral relations.

In the years and months preceding the January 2010 earthquake, President Fernandez commissioned a strategic plan to examine the future of Dominican Haitian relations. The study conducted by Newlink Research posited that the future of both countries was irrevocably linked and that the best long term approach was to pursue greater integration with their neighbor. Presented only a couple of months before the January earthquake, the study anticipated many of the plans that surfaced its aftermath. In short, the premise of the study was that the Bilateral Commission was the only mechanism that would serve as an integration mechanism, at least in the short term. For the authors of the document, in the long term, the Dominican Republic and Haiti faced a common future that would require economic integration, the development of a common logistical framework including power, energy, transportation networks, and closer political relations. In some measure, the opportunity to pursue such an ambitious goal came as a result of Haiti's gravest national tragedy.

The greatest paradox in Haitian Dominican relations is that the huge earthquake that tragically struck Port au-Prince on January 11, 2010 moved both countries closer than they have ever been in the 166 years since independence. Dominicans were the first to arrive to provide relief to the injured. President Leonel Fernandez was the first head of state to arrive at the scene a mere 36 hours after the quake. He subsequently hosted two international conferences with the objective of securing a more rapid disbursement of promised international aid for Haiti. Over the course of the following months, the Dominican government provided millions of dollars worth of relief ranging from medical and school supplies, to treating the injured in Dominican hospitals, and even initiating the construction of a university in the city of Cape Haitien. The total aid figure is hard to quantify but the university cost alone is projected to exceed \$40 million. The Dominican private sector also played a major role in the disaster relief effort. They are currently playing a major role in the reconstruction of Haiti as well.

The final serious Haitian challenge has been the massive outbreak of cholera. At this writing a dozen cases were reported in the Dominican Republic and unfortunately, this has led to the re emergence of some anti-Haitian nationalism and calls for closing down the border. In fact, the border was closed for a few days, especially the binational markets where Dominicans and Haitians buy and sell good to each other several times a week. The Dominican response to the

cholera outbreak has been as mature as its response to the earthquake. The difference is that Haitians have also been unfairly associated with the spread of illness, including in the recent past HIV and Dengue. So far, the Dominican response has been extraordinary mainly because despite the nationalist outburst, it has continued to focus on dealing with the disease from a purely public health perspective.

US Proximity and Influence

The proximity of the United States influenced the development of Dominican Strategic Culture in ways that are both subtle and obvious. US intervention ranged from an all out campaign to annex the Dominican Republic under President Ulysses S. Grant in pursuit of private economic interests, to the first military intervention in pursuit of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, to collect customs fees on behalf of a consortium of European bondholders whose interest payments had been suspended by the Dominican government, to the military occupation of 1965 during the middle of the Cold War.

As a result, it is not farfetched to argue that next to Haiti, the country that has most influenced the development of Dominican Strategic Culture has been the United States. The obvious and long term historical influence is evident from the role the US played as both protector and intervener. As noted above, seeking protection from Haiti motivated some Dominicans to seek annexation. Subsequent US interventions produced important long term effects. The most obvious and long term was the emergence of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo from the ranks of a US created constabulary force to absolute ruler of the Dominican Republic for three decades.

Joseph Tulchin provides an interesting interpretation of the impact on Dominican Strategic Culture of repeated US intervention. In his view, the most significant impact was that it became a *penetrated polity* characterized by a triangle that includes the United States as a participant in the local political debate. In this particular kind of role, domestic politics slid into a zero sum game with the US siding generally with the winners through and including armed intervention.

“The important feature of penetrated politics is that... the discourse of politics is never entirely about the issues discussed in the public forum, whether in an electoral campaign or in the contestation for power without recourse to something so formal and

institutionalized as an election. In a penetrated country, in which an outside power is a participant in the local political contest for control, power is considered a zero sum game. Compromise and tolerance, so important to stability in a democracy, are seen as unnecessary because the outside ally will provide the help necessary to eliminate the opposition. And, where one faction controls the state, it relies on the outside ally to maintain its power, even by violating the terms of agreement with that ally.”⁶

In addition to the overt military intervention of the United States, the Dominican Republic was indeed a significant source of private US investment especially in the agricultural sector. The presence of companies such as United Fruit and later Gulf and Western loomed large over the national economy, providing the Dominican Republic with a significant source of income. As elsewhere in the region, the relationship of these large scale agricultural investors and the local elite had significant political connotations. Despite the authoritarianism of Trujillo and subsequently of Joaquin Balaguer, US companies focused on production and profits. As the nature of the sugar industry changed globally, the nature of the Dominican agroindustrial complex also changed dramatically. In the 1970s some of the very same companies became the precursors of the contemporary tourism industry that is the country’s principal source of income. Tulchin’s characterization of the role played historically by the US has changed dramatically in the last thirty years, although its influence is still of enormous proportions. Since the 1965 invasion that led to the election of Joaquin Balaguer, one of Trujillo’s closest allies and who would go on to become one of the most significant political leaders in Dominican history, the possibility of an outright US military intervention is unlikely. The changing nature of US influence is rooted in both the democratization experience that got under way in 1978 and in the remarkable growth of Dominican immigration to the United States.

Unlike the experience of other Latin American countries, the Dominican experience with democratization had to do less with breaking from military domination of politics and more with a slow process of moving away from the legacies of the Trujillo period, prolonged by the iron grip with which and elected ruler, Joaquin Balaguer, ruled the country between 1966 and 1978. When Balaguer attempted to stay in power through electoral fraud in 1978, president Jimmy Carter’s pressure allowed the Revolutionary Dominican Party (Partido Revolucionario

⁶ Joseph Tulchin, *The Fruits of Naboth’s Vineyard: The Origins of Strategic Culture in the Dominican Republic*.

Dominicano-PRD) to assume power. The positive role played by Washington helped move the Dominican Republic toward a form of liberal representative democracy that it continues to pursue.

In the mid 1990s allegations of fraud against Balaguer did not lead to an overt US intervention. Instead a more regional approach helped solve the impasse between Balaguer and opposition parties leading to the election for the first time of current president Leonel Fernandez Reyna. The election of Fernandez brought to the fore a series of new dynamics in the relations between the Dominican Republic and the United States. The personal history of Fernandez illustrates in some measure this changing dynamic.

Fernandez quite literally grew up in New York City where he attended public schools, learned English, and composed part of a significant wave of Dominican migrants who left the island for a variety of reasons, although in the 1960s many left for political reasons. Life in New York certainly had an impact on Fernandez's world view. In his late adolescence Fernandez returned to the Dominican Republic where he studied law at the Universidad Autonoma de Santo Domingo, the country's-and the hemisphere's-oldest university. The context of his return was extremely important. In the United States, the debates over Vietnam raged and in Santo Domingo, especially at the UASD, students engaged in anti-American movements stemming from the 1965 invasion and Washington's support for the elected and repressive government of Joaquin Balaguer. Not surprisingly, Fernandez became drawn to the writings and teachings of Juan Bosch, the founder of the PRD and the Dominican Liberation Party (Partido de la Liberacion Dominicana-PLD) the nation's two principal parties. The US intervention in 1965 had largely been aimed at removing Bosch from office.

Fernandez matured politically with Bosch and the PLD; at the same time, he graduated as a lawyer and became a prolific reader and author. In the late 70s and throughout the 1980s, Fernandez taught at his alma mater and at the Latin American Social Sciences School (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales-FLACSO). One of his key teaching interests was not surprisingly, US-Caribbean relations.

The intricacies of how Fernandez arrived in office are available elsewhere.⁷ For our purposes here, suffice it to say that he was uniquely prepared to rethink and revamp the prevalent pattern of US-Dominican relations. He understood the complexities of the relationship and the negative impact of military intervention but also had a very profound understanding of the nature of globalization and the role that his country would have to play to get ahead despite the difficulties. One of the principal objectives during his three periods in office has been to: establish a prudent distance from Washington, engage in relations with countries that are even unfriendly to the United States, and simultaneously deepen the bonds with Americans ranging from welcoming investors, developing exchanges with US universities, forging ties with Chambers of Commerce, and establishing linkages with civil society organizations in the United States.


Fernandez has been relatively successful at implementing this approach, although it has not necessarily always been met with US satisfaction. During the Bush Administration, for example, Fernandez's autonomy came under question for being too close to the Venezuelan government or for not necessarily being lined up with broader global US goals.

Finally, another important contributing factor to the changing nature of US-Dominican relations is the very large Dominican migration to the United States and the role it has played over the past few years, both in terms of sending remittances home and to the generally favorable economic times that have fallen upon the Dominican Republic. Dominican migrants to the United States are not only becoming a factor in the growth and stability of their home nation but they are also increasingly significant and prominent members of their adoptive towns and cities, mainly across the eastern seaboard. Unlike other Hispanic groups, a relatively low proportion of Dominicans in the United States is undocumented. While this is also not the place to analyze the role and presence of Dominicans in the United States; suffice it to say that their pattern of integration into the United States parallels other successful groups.

The success of Dominican migrants to the United States is related in great measure to an interesting and final observation. One might expect that given the relative temporal proximity of the 1965 invasion, anti-American sentiment might prevail among Dominicans. Perhaps because

⁷ Jonathan Hartlyn, Crisis-Ridden Elections (Again) in the Dominican Republic: Neopatrimonialism, Presidentialism, and Weak Electoral Oversight. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Winter, 1994), pp. 91-144

of the extensive ties that bind migrants and their families back home, in a range of public opinion polls, Dominicans give very high marks to the United States and to their head of state.



Geography and Geology: Hispaniola, Caribbean

A second critical set of structural factors explains the political culture of the Dominican Republic. Some of these cannot be changed by any means, while others can be changed if met with successful long term policy.

The most obvious is the recurrent vulnerability to climate and natural disasters faced by the Dominican Republic. Over the course of the past 100 years, literally dozens of hurricanes have affected the country. In September 1930 Hurricane Zenón leveled Santo Domingo, killed and injured thousands of Dominicans. In the late 1970s back to back hurricanes caused death and destruction in the city of San Cristobal. In September 1998, Hurricane Georges hit the eastern part of the Dominican Republic also creating death and destruction. More recently in 2007, Tropical Storm Olga caused severe flooding that led to the death of nearly 50 people.

The Dominican Republic also sits on top of major Caribbean fault lines. Geologists believe that the country is enormously vulnerable to earthquakes and that it is likely unprepared for a major event at some point in the future. According to Grenville Draper, an FIU geologist who has studied the Dominican Republic, one of the northern faults has not released tension in nearly six hundred years and if it were to move, it would probably result in an earthquake of over 8 points on the Richter Scale.⁸ Such a huge earthquake was already felt once within the last century; in August 1946 a magnitude 8.0 earthquake and several aftershocks killed 100 people, left 20,000 homeless and destroyed the northern town of Samaná, a major contemporary tourist destination. The earthquake affected the entire northern coast and was felt with great intensity in Santiago, the second most populous city in the country.⁹ An earthquake of similar size today would likely have enormous consequences in terms of loss of life and property.

This kind of vulnerability to natural disasters can be addressed only by long term mitigation efforts including education programs, improved building codes, and other more specialized measures. In some measure, the Dominican Republic has been extraordinarily fortunate when considering its Haitian neighbor. Its luck unfortunately is not likely to last forever. In contrast to Haiti, the Dominicans possess the capacity and strength at the state level to conduct a serious long term mitigation effort. However, the effort thus far has only been halfhearted and requires a significant amount of political muscle to prepare Dominicans for what is likely to occur.

Porous Air, Land, and Sea borders

The geography and location of the Dominican Republic also make it extremely vulnerable to man made threats. Its porous land border makes the country susceptible to contraband of all types, especially human and drug trafficking. Human trafficking is probably a more serious problem because of the displacement of people following the January 2010 earthquake that affected Port au Prince. Of particular concern is the trafficking of children who are now visible on the streets of the Dominican Republic's major cities. Unabated human trafficking will likely continue not by virtue of Dominican inefficiency at controlling its border but because the magnitude of the problem is huge. This is clearly an area where left to its own

⁸ Personal conversation with the author, November 2010.

⁹ Historic Earthquakes consulted at: http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/events/1946_08_04.php

devices and without significant international assistance, Dominicans will be unable to respond as relatively efficiently as they have until now.


The Dominican Republic is strategically located for the activities of organized crime, especially drug trafficking organizations. While the problem has become more serious in the past decade, US and European destined drug loads have relied on Dominican transshipment since at least the mid 1980s. During this decade, the flow has intensified dramatically; major shipments are confiscated on a regular basis by authorities. Moreover, the problem was so severe that literally dozens of instances of drug smuggling would occur monthly along the southern, eastern, northeastern coasts and even in some of the lakes in the middle of the country. Focus group research conducted by Newlink Research revealed anecdotes about drug in kind payments to residents of small towns to turn over the drug shipments.

Unlike the mid 1980s, however, the Dominican Republic is not only a transshipment hub. Today one of the most serious problems involves “domestic microtrafficking” which caters to a growing internal consumption market. Recent figures from a survey conducted by the National Drug Council report that nearly one percent of the population has used drugs. Microtrafficking and major narcotrafficking accounts for a large portion of violent crime and criminality throughout the country but especially in the largest urban centers. Like elsewhere, it also accounts for increasing corruption within the armed forces, the police, and every institution that comes in touch with the industry.

Weak State and Institutions

A few years ago, violating its own rankings, Foreign Policy classified the Dominican Republic as a failed state. The 2010 rankings by the same magazine rank the country well above others in Latin America. While the overall value of such rankings is arguable, the more recent rankings reveal that the Dominican Republic does indeed lack a strong state and that its institutions are still largely incipient.

Failed States Index: Rankings in Latin America and Caribbean



Within this comparison with other countries in the hemisphere, it is important to place the Dominican Republic in the proper perspective. It is equally important to compare these results with Haiti, an obvious case of state failure. Again, with the warning that these rankings are arbitrary and not necessarily rigorous, the categories reveal the extreme difference between both countries and why the Dominican Republic fares so much better than its neighbors. The gravest challenge includes mainly growing demographic pressure primarily resulting from uncontrolled Haitian migration.

FP Magazine 2010 Failed State Rankings Instability Indicator (Scale 1-10)

	Haiti	Dominican Republic
Demographic Pressures	9.3	6.5
Refugees	5.6	5.1
Group grievance	7.3	5.8
Human Flight	8.6	8.3
Uneven development	8.3	7.8
Economic decline	9.2	5.9
Delegitimation of state	9.3	5.6
Public Services	9.5	6.9
Human Rights	8.3	6.5
Security apparatus	8.2	5.6
Factionalized elites	8.4	6.8
External intervention	9.6	6.8
Total	101.6	76.8

The Dominican state in relative terms is strong. It has a modicum of control over the border, despite the potential for an enormous human wave to flow across it seeking jobs and safety. Moreover, the State is able to implement public policy throughout its national territory. One of the most interesting examples concerns a Brazilian-like cash conditional transfer program called Solidaridad. This program has been successful nationwide in targeting families and their children to improve school retention and immunization. In other words, and perhaps better than many Latin American countries, the Dominican State is able to implement public services in even remote areas of the country.

At the same time, while the Solidaridad program shows that public policy can have a national scope, the inability of the state to provide an efficient and regular supply of electricity to the average Dominican is the Achilles heel of the model. The lack of electricity not only affects the competitiveness of the country in attracting foreign investment, it is also linked to disparate issues such as increasing crime and social discontent.

Institutional weakness, however, prevails and often gets in the way of a more efficient implementation of public policy. Problems of institutional capacity are evident throughout the system. Of particular note is the duplication of services, the absence of a permanent civil service, and the inability to coordinate programs more effectively.

Institutional weakness is perhaps tied more directly to political culture. Dominican institutions are susceptible to the influence and role played by individuals. Thus, when a specific cabinet member changes, the entire ministry can also undergo a major shift in personnel as well as its policies. This logic is tied closely with the historical prevalence of national and political party caudillos that still dominate political life.

Many authors have noted the overwhelming importance of caudillos. Less than a dozen individuals have been the protagonists of this feature. The twentieth century can be reduced perhaps to the overwhelming importance of Trujillo, Balaguer, Bosch, and more recently Fernandez. In all cases, except Bosch, these individuals not only governed the country for several years, they were also perceived as indispensable for the country's future. And, for better or worse, these individuals are undoubtedly the most important modernizing figures of the country.

The importance of these authoritarian (Trujillo and Balaguer) and democratic (Fernandez) regimes is the clientelistic nature of the system. In some measure, all authority rests

with the chief executive partially because of the presidential nature of the system. In contrast to other presidential systems in the region, in the Dominican Republic nothing appears to get resolved without the intervention of the president. And, generally the overwhelming importance of the president is tied to the significant role that he and his party play in the distribution of jobs, contracts, and other benefits.

This is a structural characteristic that is unlikely to change and which is also paradoxically responsible for the relative success of the system. This is a system that binds citizens, the private sector, political parties and all other institutions. It also contributes to the charges of widespread corruption and the subsequent erosion of support for democracy and the political institutions that run the system.

Keepers of Dominican Strategic Culture

The most important keeper of Dominican Strategic Culture is a relatively stable three party system. Despite an enormous drop in popularity following the Social Christian Reformist Party (Partido Reformista Social Cristiano-PRSC) after the death of Joaquin Balaguer, this party continues to exert influence. In some measure the PRSC plays a spoiler role during elections, generally pushing one of the two major parties to victory. In contemporary Dominican politics and as the country moves to the 2012 elections, it is likely that whomever the PRSC supports (who could garner as little as five percent or as much as 15 percent of the vote) will win the presidency.

The PLD and the PRD will likely continue to dominate Dominican politics for years to come. Recent public opinion polls show that during this decade the PLD has overcome the PRD as the largest political party, (55 percent of Dominicans consider themselves PLDistas) mainly owing to the popularity of its leader and current president Leonel Fernandez Reyna. Unlike the PRSC, the PLD was able to identify a talented successor to Juan Bosch, the founder of the party. Under Fernandez, the PLD became a mass based party leaving behind its image of being only a “partido de cuadros” or a small cadre of disciplined and mainly intellectual followers.

The most significant challenge to the PLD will be determining Fernandez’s successor. This decision is not off in the future but is an immediate decision as the 2012 electoral contest gets underway. In contrast to the other parties in the system, the PLD is still a very disciplined

party that is likely to settle some major internal disputes and then rally around whomever is named as party candidate for the May 2012 elections.

The third pillar of the party system is the PRD which until very recently was the largest mass based party in the Dominican Republic. This party, which classifies itself as a social democratic party, has much in common with Peru's APRA, Bolivia's MNR, and even Argentina's Partido Justicialista. It is fair to say that the PRD was the party that most influenced the transition to democracy in the 1970s and 1980s. Founded in the 1940s by Juan Bosch, the party was able to develop a talented pool of leaders, two of whom became important transition presidents (Antonio Guzman and Salvador Jorge Blanco).

The PRD's most charismatic and talented leader was José Francisco Peña Gómez who lost the 1996 elections to Leonel Fernandez by a narrow margin. His premature death to cancer in 1998 led the PRD down a path of succession that it has yet to resolve. In 2000, the PRD won the national elections with Hipólito Mejía as the candidate. A very popular man, he mistakenly pushed constitutional reform through a PRD dominated Congress to pursue reelection. His popularity waned, however, when a major banking scandal nearly led to the collapse of the Dominican economy. The new reelection clause opened the floodgates for the return of Leonel Fernandez and contributed enormously to the growth of the PLD.

The PRD finds itself deeply divided and its major challenge as the 2012 elections approach will be to bring together factions led by Hipólito Mejía and Miguel Vargas, the unsuccessful party candidate for the 2008 national elections. If it is able to rally around either one of these two men, it may have a fighting chance to defeat the PLD. Recent history shows that the PRD rarely overcomes internal divisions and these then mitigate any possibility of winning a national electoral round.

This three party system is probably the most important source of support for Dominican Strategic Culture. While anti party sentiment is high –like elsewhere in the region political parties are not trusted by most citizens—Dominicans vote for parties and their candidates and no significant alternative party or anti systemic movement has even appeared. For the foreseeable future this is likely to continue.

The principal reason explaining the overwhelming importance of the party system has to do with the profoundly clientelistic nature of Dominican politics. Political parties are perceived less as bearers of programmatic and or ideological content and more as providers of posts, jobs,

and contracts for loyal followers. The Dominican pattern is an extreme version of a prevalent pattern in the region. Elsewhere this pattern has been called Neopatrimonial, especially because of the role played by charismatic leaders.¹⁰

The Business Elite

The business elite in the Dominican Republic are also important keepers of Strategic Culture. This group has been a small sector historically and it has invariably been linked to politics. Their linkage to politics stems from a reciprocal relationship that originated during the early years of the republic. The nature of the relationship is not different than the one that characterized other export sectors throughout the Americas. The agricultural exports that prevailed had an enormous impact on the kind of development process that the Dominican Republic experienced until the latter half of the twentieth century. In many ways, the Dominican Republic represented a typical case of dependent development tied to the upswings and downswings in the market of the country's principal exports. It was not surprising then to see just a few families closely tied to governments and also the beneficiaries of contracts, land grants, and favorable policies.

The contemporary business sector is still very much interested in the preservation of the status quo; however, it has become larger and much more diverse. While the economy is still heavily influenced by agricultural exports, today products such as cacao are more important than sugar. At the same time, the economy as a whole has shifted to the extent that today services are more important overall than primary product exports. Tourism is the largest foreign revenue generator and the Dominican Republic has come to occupy a very privileged position in this industry worldwide. One of the reasons for the good performance of the Dominican economy during the current world financial crisis resides in the overall health of the tourism sector. Moreover, the Dominican tourism industry benefited enormously from the misfortune of Mexico where the health and security crisis led tourists to seek other destinations.

While the size of the private sector continues to be small, a few family companies are performing on a global scale. These companies are undergoing important transformations and are following worldwide social responsibility currents. These same companies, belonging to the

¹⁰ See Jonathan Hartlyn for the Dominican case and James M. Malloy and Eduardo Gamarra *Revolution and Reaction: Bolivia 1964-1984* (Transaction Books, 1988) for a discussion of neopatrimonialism.

prominent Vicini, Grullón and Estrella among other families, also played a very laudable role in the post earthquake humanitarian effort in Haiti. Other groups linked to cacao production are also important investors in countries such as Ecuador, Colombia, and even Venezuela.

For the Dominican business community, political continuity has been important. The good performance of the economy has been largely attributed to President Fernández's handling of macroeconomic stability and growth policies. Thus, much of the private sector has supported the PLD government and would be pleased with continuity. As with other sectors of the Dominican society, the overall perception is that the PRD has had very bad luck in office. The 2000-2004 period characterized by the collapse of the banking industry still looms large.

While a good portion of the private sector might see continuity in partisan terms, the reality is that all three political parties are expressions of the continuity of the Strategic Culture that benefits the long term health of this sector and by extension the pattern of economic growth that has prevailed over the last seven years. As is the case elsewhere, the private sector provides funding for campaigns and is vested in the outcome of electoral cycles.

The Armed Forces and the National Police

Unlike the armed forces of other Latin American countries, Dominican soldiers have played only a secondary role in the politics of this country. Nonetheless, they are important keepers of Strategic Culture. They were an important player during the twelve years under Balaguer (1966-1978) at the height of the Cold War. The National Police during this period was less a public security institution and more a branch of the Armed Forces which the Balaguer government used to clamp down on the political left.

The security sector as a whole has undergone a very slow process of reform since 1978. The military retains an enormous amount of autonomy from civilian sectors especially in terms of its budget and overall management. Civilians not only lack the expertise on security and defense issues; they also play no role in the overall supervision of the institution. The Minister of Defense, for example, performs a function equivalent to commander of the institution. Thus, there is no independent bureaucracy that oversees the armed forces.

Despite the extent of this autonomy, the armed forces are extremely politicized. Promotions are less grounded in merit and more with the specific political ties with prominent

political sectors. And, as is the case with the police, military officers perform a large number of jobs for politicians ranging from chauffeurs to body guards.

In short, the Armed Forces have been a very slow changing institution. Today it has been attempting to redefine its mission in terms of the contemporary threats that face the Dominican Republic. The new threats defined by the institution include natural disasters, drug trafficking and border control. Since January 2010, the institution played a very significant role in the humanitarian effort in Haiti. And, it is still the main institution in charge of the border, a daunting task not only in the aftermath of the earthquake but in the more recent context of the cholera outbreak.

The armed forces have also become a very prominent actor in the fight against drug trafficking. And it has involved all three branches in this battle. The Navy attempts to patrol the coasts with the few resources it possesses. The air force now owns eight Brazilian Tucanos which are used to patrol the airspace and thus prevent air drops by Colombian and Venezuelan small planes. The army has been used extensively to control internal trafficking routes that move drugs from the coast inland and then back to the coast for transshipment. As has been a recurrent pattern in every nation afflicted by drug trafficking, corruption has been a major problem in the armed forces. Major purges have occurred and dozens of members have been kicked out of the institution. The problem, however, is still very large and is unlikely to disappear overnight.

The National Police has been even more reticent to change than the armed forces. Its resistance to change is rooted in some measure in its military training and formation that in a way makes it not a civilian institution but another branch of the armed forces. While the government has made important efforts to modernize the institution from a logistics and equipment perspective, the structure of the police essentially remains the same as during the Trujillo and Balaguer periods.

Nothing illustrates the resistance to change better than the privileged position held by the Chief of Police. Bureaucratically speaking the Chief reports to the Minister of Interior and Police, yet in reality he has direct access to the president and holds the equivalent of a cabinet level position. That each Chief is also the institution's highest ranking general also contributes to the institutions enduring military character. Both of these characteristics have served to politicize the institution. Potential police chiefs are always campaigning and conspiring with supporters from the political sector and thousands of police officers serve politicians in a variety

of ways instead of patrolling the streets—adding more to the patrimonial relationship between the security forces and the politicians.

Given this reality, the armed forces and police are specifically vested in the continuity of the system and are resistant to any fundamental change that would affect their prerogatives and privileges. At the same time, the large number of prerogatives contributes to their support for civilian leadership and thus they are unlikely to ever contemplate a more direct role in the political system.

The Future of Strategic Culture in the Dominican Republic

Despite the magnitude of the challenges faced by the Dominican Republic, the long term outlook for the country appears positive. However, the challenges are indeed many. The most serious challenge continues to be as it has been from the beginning: how to deal with the multiple Haitian issues that affect the country daily. In the near term, Dominicans will have to respond effectively to the cholera outbreak to prevent it from also becoming a national health crisis.

In the mid and long term, they will have to deal with the immigration of thousands of undocumented Haitians. The Dominican Republic will inevitably have to find a way to respond to what could become a crisis of major proportions. This has been a national debate for many years which today has acquired even more urgency. As is the case in the United States, Europe and in other areas, the presence of a large number of undocumented aliens who have a different language and culture sparks great controversy and brings forth nationalism and xenophobia. Unlike the United States, however, the Dominican Republic already faces demographic pressures that make it more difficult to assimilate thousands of migrants each day. The country also lacks the financial means to address this problem on its own.

In the long term, the Haitian presence in the Dominican Republic will have an impact on Strategic Culture. For the moment, despite the history, Strategic Culture has led to creative and peaceful ways to address the major challenges of the day, such as the earthquake and cholera. It is clear, however, that if the “international” community does not play a more active role in addressing Haiti’s problems, these will become major challenges to Dominican Strategic Culture and in the long term could lead to increasing border tensions and a massive resurgence of nationalism and xenophobia.

Dominican Strategic Culture is unlikely to change significantly because its keepers are enormous beneficiaries. More important, the benefits of the system have led to high rates of economic growth that serve mainly to support the status quo. Given the slow nature of change in the country, to avoid increasing anti system sentiment the main challenge will be to address the problems stemming from poverty and inequality. To address these through cash transfer programs is important, as the Solidaridad program has shown. It is certainly not sufficient as the only vehicle for minimizing social discontent is job creation. At the same time, the system will inevitably have to resolve the basic problem of efficiently providing affordable electricity and energy services to all Dominicans.

Selected Bibliography

Emelio Betances, *Social Classes and the Origin of the Modern State: The Dominican Republic, 1844-1930*. *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Summer, 1995), pp. 20-40.

Rosario Espinal, *Dominican Republic: Electoralism, Pacts, and Clientelism in the Making of a Democratic Regime*. In C. Edie ed., *Democracy in the Caribbean*. (Praeger Publishers, 1994).

Rosario Espinal, *Economic Restructuring, Social Protest, and Democratization in the Dominican Republic*, *Latin American Perspectives*. Volume 22. Number 3 (Summer 1995), pp.63-79.

Jonathan Hartlyn, *Crisis-Ridden Elections (Again) in the Dominican Republic: Neopatrimonialism, Presidentialism, and Weak Electoral Oversight*. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Winter, 1994), pp. 91-144

Philip Keefer, *The political economy of public spending decisions in the Dominican Republic: credibility, clientelism and political institutions: Report prepared for the Public Expenditure and Institutional Review*, World Bank Development Research Group (DECRG) March 28, 2002

Samuel Martinez, *From Hidden Hand to Heavy Hand: Sugar, the State and Migrant Labor in the Dominican Republic*. *Latin American Research Review*. Volume 34 Number 1 (1999), pp. 57-84.

Samuel Martinez, *Not a Cockfight: Rethinking Haitian-Dominican Relations*. *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 30, No. 3, *Popular Participation against Neoliberalism* (May, 2003), pp. 80-101.

Clare M. Ribando *Dominican Republic: Political and Economic Conditions with the United States*, CRS Report for Congress, March 2005.

Cynthia So, *The Causes and Consequences of Undocumented Haitian Immigration to the Dominican Republic*. Paper for delivery at the 2009 Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil June 11-14, 2009.

About the Author

Eduardo A. Gamarra received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Pittsburgh in 1987. He has been affiliated with Florida International University since 1986 and he is the former director of the Latin American and Caribbean Center, professor of political science, and the editor of *Hemisphere*, a magazine on Latin American and Caribbean affairs. He is the author, co-author, and editor of several books including *Revolution and Reaction: Bolivia 1964-1985* (Transaction Publishers, 1988); three volumes of the *Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record* (Holmes and Meier Press); *Latin American Political Economy in the Age of Neoliberal Reform* (Lyne Rienner Publishers 1994); *Democracy Markets and Structural Reform in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico* (Lyne Rienner Publishers, 1995); and *Entre la Droga y la Democracia* (Freiderich Ebert Foundation, 1994). The author of over fifty articles on Latin America and the Caribbean, he has testified in the US Congress on drug policy toward Latin America.

Over the course of the last fifteen years, Dr. Gamarra has been a consultant to multilateral agencies, the Library of Congress, foundations, and government agencies throughout the hemisphere. He has lectured on issues ranging from narcotics trafficking and US Latin American policy to democratization and structural reform at universities throughout the United States, Canada, the Caribbean, Latin America, and Europe. He has been quoted in various periodicals ranging from *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Wall Street Journal* to *El Tiempo de Bogota*, *El Mercurio de Chile*, and *La Razon de La Paz*, Bolivia. His current research focuses on the political economy of narcotics trafficking, problems of democratization, and civil-military relations in the Andean region and the Caribbean. Most recently, Dr. Gamarra has been working on US policy toward Colombia and is directing a project on the Colombian migration to the United States.

**FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
APPLIED RESEARCH CENTER (ARC)**

Dr. John Proni
ARC Executive Director

Dr. Norman Munroe
ARC Director of Research

Jerry F. Miller, Colonel, USAF (Ret.)
ARC Associate Director

STRATEGIC CULTURE STUDY FACILITATORS

Brian Fonseca (Fonsecab@fiu.edu)
Moisés Caballero (Moises.caballero@fiu.edu)

GRADUATE & UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH ASSISTANTS

Michael Fernandez Carlos Sarmiento Pamela Pamela
Juan Muskus Yuliet Llanes

COMPLETED STRATEGIC CULTURE FINDINGS REPORTS

Findings Report 1-Venezuela (Jun/09)	Findings Report 8 - Bolivia (Mar/10)
Findings Report 2 - Cuba (Jul/09)	Findings Report 9 - Argentina (Apr/10)
Findings Report 3 - Haiti (Aug/09)	Findings Report 10 - Chile (Apr/10)
Findings Report 4 - Colombia (Sept/09)	Findings Report 11 - Guatemala (Jun/10)
Findings Report 5 - Brazil (Oct/09)	Findings Report 12 - Peru (Sept/10)
Findings Report 6 - Ecuador (Nov/09)	Findings Report 13 – El Salvador (Oct/10)
Findings Report 7 - Nicaragua (Dec/09)	Findings Report 14 – Dominican Republic (Nov/10)

FORTHCOMING STRATEGIC CULTURE FINDINGS REPORTS

Findings Report 15 - Paraguay (Dec/10)
Findings Report 16 - Honduras (Dec/10)
Findings Report 17 – Uruguay (Jan/10)



Applied Research Center

Latin American and Caribbean Center

Florida International University